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In much of tropical Africa a breakdown in law and order, corruption and an influx of firearms 
led to heavy rhino and elephant poaching, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. I collected and 
analysed data to reveal the collapsing numbers of rhinos in Africa. Although we had general 
trade information, we needed more understanding of the soaring smuggling and consumption 
in order to combat it. I carried out extensive fieldwork in the main market at the time: North 
Yemen (Yemen from 1990). From the 1980s I regularly monitored the trade in rhino horn 
used for prestigious curved dagger (jambiya) handles, updating information on smuggling 
routes, prices, and demand. I worked with Yemenis on education campaigns, encouraged 
substitutes, and assisted policy makers, with Esmond Martin, who was to become my long-
term research colleague. In the Indian subcontinent, home to most Asian rhinos, we also 
worked with officials and local people on strategies to fight rhino poaching and smuggling. 
And in eastern Asia we surveyed consumer markets for rhino horn used in traditional Oriental 
medicine to close down illegal trade. Around 2010 demand escalated once again causing 
serious rhino poaching, this time mainly in South Africa for customers in China and Vietnam, 
but again information was lacking.  I surveyed illegal markets and collected prices of rhino 
horn, in order to strengthen legislation and enforcement. Demand for elephant ivory also 
rocketed from about 2010 onwards and we learned newly moneyed undiscerning Chinese 
consumers were eager to acquire mass-produced ivory items. We carried out market surveys 
in key illegal African and Asian markets to alert decision makers to control the surge in 
trafficking and unregulated retail sales, mostly for mainland Chinese. A new Chinese 
diaspora and the internet encouraged this lucrative trade, fuelled by corruption, 
mismanagement and apathy in many regions.  Human population pressure on valuable natural 
resources is rising, resulting in climate change and wildlife crime increasing, and biodiversity 
in wild habitats more threatened, plus spreading zoonotic diseases. Compared with the 1980s 
there is at last growing attention to these challenges, including wildlife crime, in search of 
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(Box 1), all based on my field research. These Annexes are referenced in bold in the text. 
My publications were often illustrated to help inform people about rhino horn and ivory items 
seen for sale, as in this thesis (Cover photograph, Figs. 1 to 10). 
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ANNEX 10. Vigne L, Martin E. 1991. African and Asian rhino products for sale in Bangkok. 
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ANNEX 11. Vigne L, Martin E. 2018. Illegal rhino horn trade in eastern Asia still threatens Kruger’s 
rhinos. The Aspinall Foundation, UK. 120 pages.  
 
Part 3: Ivory markets on the African continent (five publications) 
ANNEX 12. Martin E, Vigne L. 2010. The status of the retail ivory trade in Addis Ababa in 2009. 
TRAFFIC Bulletin 22(3):141–146. 
ANNEX 13. Martin E, Vigne L. 2011. Illegal ivory sales in Egypt. TRAFFIC Bulletin 23(3):117–122. 
ANNEX 14. Martin E, Vigne L. 2013. Lagos, Nigeria: one of the largest retail centres for illegal ivory 
surveyed to date. TRAFFIC Bulletin 25(1):35–40. 
ANNEX 15. Vigne L, Martin E. 2014. Findings on the flourishing ivory trade in Angola’s capital, 
Luanda. TRAFFIC Bulletin 26(2):44–46.  
ANNEX 16. Vigne L. 2016/2017. A tale of two African cities – ivory trade comparisons in 
Khartoum/Omdurman and Addis Ababa. Pachyderm 58:88–96.  
 
Part 4: The ivory trade in eastern Asia, eleven publications (11 publications) 
ANNEX 17. Vigne L, Martin E. 2010. Consumer demand for ivory in Japan declines. Pachyderm 
47:45–54.  
ANNEX 18. Vigne L. 2013. Recent findings on the ivory and rhino-horn trade in Lao People’s   
Democratic Republic. Pachyderm 54:36–44. 
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ANNEX 19. Vigne L. 2016. Ivory and religious statues in the Philippines today. Pachyderm 57:48–56. 
ANNEX 20. Vigne L, Martin E. 2016. Vietnam’s illegal ivory trade threatens Africa’s elephants. Save 
the Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 84 pages.  
ANNEX 21. Vigne L, Martin E. 2017. The ivory trade of Laos: now the fastest growing in the world. 
Save the Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 88 pages.  
ANNEX 22. Vigne L, Martin E. 2018. Myanmar’s growing illegal ivory trade with China. Save the 
Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 88 pages.  
ANNEX 23. Martin E, Vigne L. 2011. The ivory dynasty: a report on the soaring demand for elephant 
and mammoth ivory in southern China. Elephant Family, The Aspinall Foundation and Columbus 
Zoo and Aquarium, UK. 22 pages. 
ANNEX 24. Vigne L, Martin E. 2014. China faces a conservation challenge: the expanding elephant 
and mammoth ivory trade in Beijing and Shanghai. Save the Elephants and The Aspinall 
Foundation, UK. 88 pages.  
ANNEX 25. Martin E, Vigne L. 2015. Hong Kong’s ivory: more items for sale than in any other city in 
the world. Save the Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 66 pages.  
ANNEX 26. Martin E, Vigne L. 2016. Macau’s elephant and mammoth ivory trade today. Pachyderm 
57:78–85. 
ANNEX 27. Vigne L, Martin E. 2017. Decline in the legal ivory trade in China in anticipation of a ban. 
Save the Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya, 84 pages.  
 
NB. Most of my fieldwork was conducted with Esmond Martin in order for two people to gather more 
accurate data and for safety in sometimes dangerous places. I increasingly took the lead role 
collecting field data, analysing it and writing it up for publication. Following Esmond’s death, other 
researchers/co-authors have kindly confirmed my published work with Esmond in this thesis 
(Appendix 1). In my publications and in my thesis, prices are reported in USD for consistency   in the 
exchange rate at the time of data collection, not corrected for inflation. I use the word ‘ivory’ for 
elephant ivory. The word ‘markets’ broadly refer to all retail outlets. I use tonnes (not tons) referring to 
1,000 kg. 
 
Fig. 2. Traditional Oriental medicines with rhino horn, for sale in the early 1980s in eastern Asia 
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Fig. 3. Endangered wildlife products often sell together for the Chinese market: rhino horn pieces at 
the back, a helmeted hornbill skull with casque, two bear gall bladders and ivory jewellery. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background Demand for wildlife products. China’s new wealth and consumption by its 
rising human population, and inadequate law enforcement in the region, has led to a rocketing 
demand for illegal wildlife species which is often combined with other global crime (ACET 
2019). Wildlife crime has become one of the largest international organized crimes because it 
was previously downplayed, but now more awareness and changing attitudes are emerging to 
encourage stronger law enforcement (ACET 2019) to support species protected by the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora or CITES 
(Table 1). In China especially, from the 2000s, trade in endangered wildlife products shot up, 
with many able to afford luxury commodities (Fig.1) (Zhao et al. 2017). This demand, 
notably for food, ‘pets’, ornaments, traditional medicine, and superstitious use, threatens 
many animals, including rhinos and elephants.  
Table 1. Details of species named in this thesis with their CITES Appendix listing dates 
Common name Latin name CITES Appendix listing date 
Black rhino Diceros bicornis Appendix I 1977 
White rhino Ceratotherium simum Appendix I 1976 
    South Africa: live trade, trophies Appendix II 1994 
    Eswatini: live trade, trophies Appendix II 2004 
Greater one-horned rhino Rhinoceros unicornis Appendix I 1975 
Sumatran rhino Dicerorhinus sumatrensis Appendix I 1975 
Javan rhino Rhinoceros sondaicus Appendix I 1975 
Asian elephant Elephas maximus Appendix I 1975 
African elephant Loxodonta africana and cyclotis  Appendix I 1989 
Pangolin (8 species) Manidae Appendix I 2016 
Helmeted hornbill Rhinoplaxis vigil  Appendix I 1975 
Saiga antelope   Saiga tatarica Appendix II 2008 
Sources: CITES.org; savetherhino.org 
 
Poaching and wildlife trafficking in countries near China increased from the 2000s for many 
endangered mammal species, including tigers, Panthera tigris (Nijman and Shepherd 2015) 
and the elusive serow, Capricornis sumatraensis (Leupen et al. 2017), as well as birds, 
reptiles and amphibians. Timber from endangered hardwoods is trafficked in huge quantities 
to China, despite legislation (UNODC and Freeland 2015; ACET 2019). Cross-border illegal 
wildlife trade has long occurred from poorer to richer countries in the region (Srikosamatara 
et al. 1992; UNODC 2020). The smuggling of pangolins into China has become rife (Nijman 
et al. 2016; Shepherd et al. 2018), and as numbers have dwindled in Southeast Asia, a new 
demand for them has grown from Africa. (Challender and MacMillan 2014; Challender et al. 
 11 
2014; Svensson et al. 2014a; Shepherd et al. 2017), with tonnes of pangolin scales smuggled 
in large shipments (often with ivory) to Asia for traditional Chinese medicine (ADMCF 
2019; UNODC 2020). A similar smuggling pattern occurred with rhino horn and ivory. As 
rhino and elephant populations collapsed in most of Asia, Africa became the main source 
(Walker 2009; Vigne and Martin 2018b).  
Threats to wild fauna and flora are growing. Major development projects, such as China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative and Africa’s economic growth strategies may bring prosperity, but 
also biodiversity loss (Esmail et al. 2020) with increasing access to wildlife for trafficking. In 
2020 COVID-19 brought to the attention of the world that considerable funds are needed to 
prevent future pandemics caused by habitat fragmentation and illegal wildlife trade that are 
major threats to nature as well as climate change (Dobson et al. 2020; Walzer 2020). We have 
to re-think nature-based tourism and encourage conservation easements to secure ecosystem 
diversity and landscape connectivity (Graves et al. 2019) safeguarding elephants and rhinos 
in their wild habitats. Not only are non-protected areas and species within them being 
destroyed, but there is also an urgent need for adequate financing to safeguard the world’s 
protected areas (Pacifici et al. 2020). There is now recognition that if rhino, elephant, and all 
wildlife conservation projects are going to work in general they require active involvement 
with knowledgeable local communities as stakeholders and guardians of wildlife, especially 
valuable species —or they will fail (Remis and Robinson 2020).  
Rhinos and elephants. Rhinos in Africa and particularly Asia have been threatened for 
centuries by human population growth and human impact, with alarming forecasts 
(Andermann et al. 2020). In Asia the main problems in the last 40 years facing the 
conservation of greater one-horned, Javan and Sumatran rhinos and Asian elephants have 
been their shrinking habitat, human–wildlife conflict and poaching for the illegal trade in 
rhino horn, ivory and skin (Khan1989; Dawson and Blackburn 1992; Tilman et al. 1994; 
Blake and Hedges 2004; Leimgruber et al. 2011; Gosling 2018; Sampson et al. 2018). In 
Africa over this period poaching for the rhino horn trade has been by far the major threat to 
both Africa’s rhino species (Vigne and Martin 2018b; CITES 2019c).  
The international trade in all Africa’s rhinos was banned in 1977 amongst CITES member 
states (Table 1), but rhino poaching in Africa for the international trade in rhino horn 
spiralled in the late 1970s and 1980s wiping out most populations (Western and Vigne 
1985; Tudge 1991), for markets in Yemen and eastern Asia (Cover photograph and Fig 2). 
Very slowly, however, with legislation and improved law enforcement, as well as greater 
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protection for those left, numbers increased on the continent.  In India and Nepal in parallel, 
greater one-horned rhino numbers slowly recovered due to political commitment and 
successful management, despite setbacks during times of civil unrest (Martin and Vigne 
1995a; Martin and Vigne 1996; Martin and Vigne 2012a).  In contrast the Javan rhino species 
has long been on the brink of extinction with fewer than a 100 for decades, and the Sumatran 
rhino species has dropped in number from several hundred in the 1980s to a few tens – 
essentially due to a lack of political will (Khan 1989; CITES 2019c). South Africa, 
recognized for the greatest rhino conservation success story since the 1970s, witnessed from 
2008 a worrying increase in rhino poaching that contributed to a significant reduction in 
numbers notably in the largest stronghold: Kruger National Park (Haas and Ferreira 2016; 
CITES 2019c, Ferreira and Pienaar 2019-2020).  This has emphasized the importance of also 
keeping rhinos on private land (Ferreira 2016; Clements et al. 2020).  
Illegal killing of elephants in Africa for ivory has caused considerable population declines 
especially since the 1970s (Wasser et al. 2010; Wittemyer et al. 2014; Cerling et al. 2016; 
Poulsen et al. 2017) due to corruption, local poverty, and high global ivory prices 
(Hauenstein et al. 2019; Schlossberg et al. 2020). Indeed in 1981 when there were over a 
million elephants on the continent, at an IUCN African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group 
(AERSG) meeting it was predicted that some elephants in Africa may not be conservable 
(Cumming and Jackson 1984). While in the 1980s it was elephant habitat loss that was the 
main threat to Asian elephants (Phanthavong and Santiapillai 1992), in tropical Africa the 
main threat was poaching, with tusks feeding into illegal and sometimes legal trade. The legal 
ivory trade from certain southern African countries with well managed elephant populations 
witnessed elephant numbers grow rapidly, requiring culling programmes in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe at that time—all parts of the elephants were utilized and this funded successful 
park management and benefited local people living with the dangers of megafauna 
(Cumming and Jackson 1984). A regulated, sustainable trade requires effective management 
in range states and consumer countries (Stiles 2004a), but more recently, with the 
uncontrolled surge in Chinese demand, this could not be managed appropriately (Vigne and 
Martin 2014b, Vigne and Martin 2017b).   
Another increasing challenge in many areas of Africa is the rising population of both 
elephants and humans competing directly for habitat. Land clearance for agriculture and 
settlement have been of great concern for elephant conservation (Parker and Amin 1983; 
Tilman et al. 1994; Myers et al. 2000) – compounded by illegal ivory trade (Pagel and Mace 
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1991). The last update from the African Elephant Database in 2016 of 415,428 ± 20,111 in 
surveyed areas, with perhaps an additional 117,127 to 135,384 other elephants in Africa 
(Thouless et al. 2016), denotes major losses in some regions (CITES 2017). While the legal 
and illegal ivory and rhino horn trades have been hotly debated for 40 years at CITES 
conferences, with trade proponents increasingly disappointed, poor law enforcement remains  
in many range and consumer states, whether or not there are forms of legal trade, and both 
pachyderms are still threatened (UNODC 2020). This is echoed by other species endangered 
from commercial wildlife trafficking (Fig. 3), with China today the main driver (ACET 2019; 
ADMCF 2018).  
1.2 Different research approaches relating to rhino horn and ivory trade 
Data and information provided for law enforcement against illegal wildlife trade (IWT) are 
shared at conferences and workshops, notably on ivory and rhino horn in order to combat 
poaching and illegal markets.  Increased funding for multidisciplinary research in recent 
years has been commendable.  
Genetics. In South Africa genome scientists have created a DNA-based individual 
identification protocol to link confiscated rhino horns to specific poaching incidents, in 
support of criminal investigations. This is called the Rhinoceros DNA Index System 
(RhODIS) and has proved highly effective for rhino horn identification (Harper et al. 2018). 
Also involving DNA, the work of Samuel Wasser and colleagues has provided important 
information about criminal networks operating from Africa (Wasser et al. 2007). They use 
molecular biology to study seized tusk DNA to link the site of poaching with the smuggling 
routes from African to Asian markets. They have shown poaching sources and the massing of 
tusks from different regions to specific East, southern and West African ports for smuggling, 
explaining that big illegal traders in recent years are interlinked in a network across Africa. 
The level of power and sophistication criminal syndicates have in moving large quantities of 
tusks off the continent is considerable, including those from the recent poaching onslaught in 
Tanzania and Mozambique (Wasser et al. 2010; EIA 2014; Wasser et al. 2018).  
Statistical modelling. Statistical modelling of ivory and rhino horn trade also is important for 
research. Milner-Gulland and Mace (1991) reviewed the quantity of tusks in trade being 12–
13% of elephants with tusks, each year in the late 1980s. The relationship between financial 
gains, detection and penalties in Zambia was modelled to understand the incentives of 
poaching, and law enforcement needs (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992). An 
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econometric model was used to describe Japan’s consumer demand for rhino horn and ivory, 
showing that it was primarily income-led (Milner-Gulland 1993) during a period of ample 
disposable income in Japan. Her academic work at the Oxford Martin Programme on the 
Illegal Wildlife Trade examines wildlife consumption, and she has explained that illegal 
wildlife trade is not a new problem and it is important to look back at attempts to address 
such trade, for insights into current policy and practice (Milner-Gulland 2018). Growing 
human population pressure and over-consumption, as well as corruption and mismanagement, 
remain the unresolved challenges (Parker and Amin1983; UNODC 2020). 
Seizure data. Statistical analysis helps interpret official ivory seizure data by examining 
where seizures have occurred, recording origin, transit and intended destination 
countries/territories, and quantities of ivory. Fiona Underwood and colleagues have analysed 
figures from the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) database for CITES (Box 3) 
(Underwood et al. 2013). Compiled by Tom Milliken with TRAFFIC (a leading NGO 
monitoring wildlife trade), this shows the growing complexity of smuggling and trade routes 
(Milliken et al. 2012; 2016; 2019).Their work has helped to identify countries that need to be 
‘watched’ and to modernize their law enforcement under the National Ivory Action Plan 
(NIAP). This started in 2013 at CITES CoP16 in Bangkok (Milliken 2013) and is updated at 
each Conference of the Parties (CoP), the last being CITES CoP18 in 2019 in Geneva that 
included in Category A for the first time Mozambique and Nigeria as countries most affected 
by illegal ivory trade, as we found in Lagos (Martin and Vigne 2013b), with China and 
Hong Kong still ranking second in prominence, and Vietnam having worsened considerably 
(CITES 2019b; Milliken et al. 2019). These countries/territories are then required by CITES 
through the NIAP process to implement CITES regulations (CITES 2019c). Tom Milliken 
with TRAFFIC has compiled data on ivory and rhino horn seizures since 1997, helping 
CITES and other agencies understand the scale of the problem (Milliken 2014).  
Market surveys. Researchers from Oxford Brookes University’s Oxford Wildlife Trade 
Research Group, and NGOs such as Monitor as well as TRAFFIC, collect comparable data 
on trade in wild animals and plants. For ivory and rhino horn, from early fieldwork in Lao 
PDR and Vietnam (Nash 1997) to ivory surveys, such as in Angola and Mozambique 
(Milliken et al. 2006), West Africa (Courable et al. 2003), Cambodia (Nguyen and Frechette 
2017) and mainland China (Zhao et al. 2017), these add to our overall understanding of 
trends to tackle illicit consumer markets.  
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Online monitoring. Since 2012 in China, monthly online e-commerce surveys collect and 
send information to law enforcement agencies for punitive action (Zhao et al. 2017). In 
March 2014 TRAFFIC began monitoring illegal ivory trade on social media platforms, 
recording advertisements, pictures and videos per user to assess trade trends and to compare 
ivory prices in legal and illegal markets (Zhao et al. 2017). Studying the growing social 
media trade has become increasingly time-consuming (Krishnasamy and Stoner 2016).  
Demand. Statisticians analyse questionnaires to ascertain what is driving illegal consumer 
demand notably in certain cities in China, drawing demand curves and collecting consumer 
profiles of potential users. This statistical analysis, such as for rhino horn, helps provide 
information for demand reduction strategies, using a random sampling methodology 
(Kennaugh 2016). USAID-funded surveys (usaidwildlifeasia.org) have increased greatly.   
Economics of trade. Economists study legal and illegal markets, examining effects of prices 
on supply and demand and the complexity of  rhino horn and ivory issues, such as stockpile 
management and speculation for investment ('t Sas-Rolfes et al. 2014; Stiles et al. 2015). 
They appraised ivory price data by using empirical methodology to indicate the extent of 
elasticity (Do et al. 2018) showing that demand for such items, embedded in Chinese culture 
whether legal or illegal, continues often irrespective of price. Economists and stakeholders 
also look at methodologies regarding the best options for rhino horn in conservation 
(Economists at Large 2013; Clements et al. 2020) investigating whether certain forms of 
trade in rhino horn and/or ivory may or may not be appropriate under certain conditions. 
Undercover investigations. In recent years undercover investigations have expanded. This 
sometimes dangerous approach includes studies by the Environmental Investigation Agency 
(EIA 2014; 2015; 2017; 2018), the Elephant Action League (Crosta et al. 2015; 2017), and 
the Wildlife Justice Commission (Stoner et al. 2017; WJC 2020a). Wayne Lotter was 
murdered in 2017 in Tanzania carrying out investigations for PAMS Foundation on ivory 
trade (Vigne and Martin 2018b), distressingly highlighting the risk in such work against 
powerful criminals. This data, collected from producing and consuming countries via 
poachers, brokers, suppliers, vendors and carving facilities, is essential to expose the main 
players who profit from the illegal ivory and rhino horn trade. Investigative journalists also 
use methodologies, interviewing criminals sometimes in jail to collect valuable information 
(Rademeyer 2012; 2016a; 2016b). Of note in 2019, collaborative intelligence work 
dismantled two big ivory transnational networks operating from Africa: the Kromah cartel 
(Marsh 2019; Anon. 2019/2020) coordinated by the United Fish and Wildlife Service 
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(USFWS), and the Shuidong network (EIA 2017; Anon. 2019/2020) with China government 
support. These show that internationally coordinated and trust-based intelligence can expose 
transnational organized wildlife crime, dealing with it as a serious crime, as for the drugs 
trade (Marsh 2019), thus helping to remove wildlife criminals’ feeling of impunity. 
Interviews. Other methodologies focus on field interviews and direct observations on wildlife 
trade patterns in different seasons at specific locations including border towns, such as in 
Myanmar (Min 2012). Questionnaires may be used for quantitative data collection on species 
hunted, trade routes and sources to help in interviewing villagers, hunters, small-scale 
dealers, middlemen and other traders, with the aid of pictures of wildlife (Min 2012). Local 
communities need disincentives to poach, and incentives to steward wildlife by reducing their 
costs of living with wild animals, in the process improving local livelihoods and fair 
governance (Martin and Vigne 2012a; Biggs et al. 2016). 
Law. There has been increased research in how to address the criminal market by examining 
the convergence between licit and illicit markets (Dininio 2020). Coordinated efforts among 
governments and agencies have helped in producing Vietnam’s National Ivory and Rhino 
Horn Action Plan (Vietnam government 2018). Legal experts collaborate with financial 
investigations to break wildlife crime networks, for which follow up methodology on 
enforcement is important (Reid and Keatinge 2020). A growing number of agencies are 
collaborating with similar methodologies to break criminal syndicates and transnational 
organized crime in ivory, rhino horn and other illegal wildlife products (FATF 2020; 
UNODC 2020).  This includes the Association for Southeast Asian countries Wildlife 
Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) and Interpol engaging more with China for 
collaboration to counter wildlife trafficking (ACET 2019). 
Court cases. Some NGOs undertake in-depth studies for various species and their products to 
assist with court cases, such as studying media information and seizure data. In Zimbabwe 
this helped to establish penalties publicized against the pangolin trade (Shepherd et al. 2017). 
Researchers also assess court cases in Hong Kong, aiming at the higher end criminals 
involved in smuggling (ADMCF 2018). 
Capacity building. Government offices (USFWS, for example) and NGOs carry out research 
and training workshops for capacity building. These include ivory and rhino horn 
identification and trade dynamics (TRAFFIC 2008). To improve the judiciary in Africa and 
strengthen wildlife prosecution and sentencing, training initiated by Space for Giants, has 
provided a clear road map for criminal justice solutions (Fletcher 2016).  
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1.3 Aims and objectives of this work 
Rhino horn and ivory have long been among the most lucrative and significant wildlife 
commodities in wildlife trade (Parker and Martin 1979; 1982; 1983) and continue to be so 
(Milliken 2014; Vigne and Martin 2018b). Ivory and rhino horn are famed for their value, 
and due to weak law enforcement and corruption along the supply chain, illegal trade 
involves sophisticated international criminal networks (Milliken and Shaw 2012) with 
increasing security implications linked to global organized crime (Milliken et al. 2016; Biggs 
et al. 2016). From the early 1980s onwards we have been seeking to understand the drivers of 
poaching and illegal trade in order to combat them. The specific aim of my research as 
presented in this thesis has been to study the sources of rhino horn and tusks, the demand for 
rhino horn and ivory, and to help combat the illegal markets that threaten rhino and elephant 
populations. My objectives have been to uncover and survey key markets in the field, 
collecting original data using a consistent methodology to gather fact-based evidence on 
rhino horn and ivory markets, and to disseminate this information widely to support action by 
stakeholders and decision makers in protecting rhino and elephant populations in the wild. 
My many photographs taken for research and for publication clearly show the uses of ivory 
and rhino horn in the markets. Vietnamese officials, for example, admitted to Tom Milliken 
of TRAFFIC a few weeks before the 2016 CITES conference that it was photographs I had 
taken for our monograph (Vigne and Martin 2016a) that convinced them of a problem 
regarding the quantity of new illegal items being made for retail sale and the need for greater 
law enforcement (Figs. 7 and 8). 
In this thesis I present a selection of my main published work (in bold in the text): a total of 
27 Annexes (within Appendix 2). My research questions focus on four topics: What is the 
extent of unregulated trade in rhino horn in 1) Yemen and 2) eastern Asia? And what is the 
extent of unregulated trade in ivory in 3) Africa and 4) eastern Asia? (Box 2). I then look at 
certain themes: 1) Why has demand shifted from one country to another over the period of 
1980 to 2020?  2) How has demand spread so much in recent years? 3) What has caused 
changes in trade and marketing? 4) In which direction is demand going?  
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Box 2. Outline: Fieldwork in four sections 
The rhino horn trade from Africa to Yemen 
My research in Yemen concentrated on smuggling routes and the rhino horn trade mainly to the 
capital, Sanaa. I collected baseline data and followed up on trade trends on subsequent surveys. 
Due to the civil war from 2014, I had to investigate through WhatsApp with a contact in Yemen in 
2017 and again in 2020. Our work brought much needed attention to the significance of Sanaa 
regarding the illegal trade in rhino horn to curb this trade (Annexes 1-6). 
The rhino horn trade to eastern Asia 
I researched rhino poaching and smuggling of rhino horn, and efforts to combat it in India and 
Nepal collating unpublished official data and interviewing officials, forest guards and local people 
for their opinions on anti-poaching strategies that work. I analysed our findings and wrote 
extensively for international support. I surveyed rhino products in India, Thailand and later in China, 
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Myanmar to learn about the developing markets in Indochina. My recent 
market survey studies revealed interesting changes in consumer demand and have been published 
to assist in finding workable solutions to the problem (Annexes 7-11). 
Ivory markets on the African continent 
In Africa I surveyed key illegal ivory markets: in Ethiopia, Egypt, Nigeria,  Angola, and Sudan 
(Fig.4), sometimes with follow up visits to ascertain trends, providing reports with data on numbers, 
types and prices of ivory items, as used by various stakeholders aiming to stop the open, 
unregulated outlets selling new ivory items (Annexes 12-16). 
Ivory markets in eastern Asia, a) Eastern Asia, b) China 
In alphabetical order I carried out fieldwork in China, Hong Kong, Japan,  Lao PDR, Macau, 
Myanmar the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam (Annexes 17-27) again often on repeated visits to 
update  findings and to help pinpoint areas of grave concern where efforts were/are needed to 








My research was guided by the needs of CITES (Box 3). CITES prohibited the international 
trade in all five endangered rhino species by 1977. The international ivory trade was 
prohibited by CITES Parties in 1989 and came into effect in January 1990. 
Box 3. CITES 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
entered into force in July 1975 as a multilateral treaty to protect endangered animals and plants. 
Countries gradually became signatories to the so-called Washington Convention (Table 2). 
CITES today has at least 183 member ‘Parties’ with trade regulated for more than 35,000 species. 
Its main role has been placing certain wildlife species on listings (Appendices) that need protecting 
in trade, with Appendix I prohibiting the international trade amongst Parties or member states. 
Every three years documents on ivory and rhino horn trade are updated for the Party Conventions 
(Conference of the Parties or CoP) with a wealth of material (CITES 2019a,b,d,c,e) to help prepare 
policy makers with factual information. Specialist researchers, many volunteering their time for the 
IUCN/SSC groups, compile data on species in trade to be discussed (iucn.org/sscgroups).  
My field data and others have been used every three years for reports produced by the IUCN 
African Elephant and African Rhino Specialist Groups (AfESG and AfRSG) to submit to CITES, in 
order to give objective empirical evidence on ivory and rhino horn markets, as well as other facts 
about poaching, smuggling and consumer demand (CITES 2017; Emslie et al. 2019). Reports for 
CITES are becoming increasingly numerous and detailed, with more NGOs collecting information 
on the wildlife trade and helping us to understand more about important markets, such as ivory in 
China (Chou 2018; Xiao 2018). It is important that neutral academic research is used to guide 
decision makers at CITES conferences and in general.  
Receiving annual ivory seizure data from member states, ETIS was set up by CITES in 1997 
together with MIKE (Monitoring of Illegal Killing of Elephants) in order to track illegal ivory trade 
(Hunter et al. 2004; CITES 2019a,b). These are processes reported to CITES at each CoP, for 
member states to use in checking where elephant poaching and smuggling may be occurring so 
that it can be confronted. Any changes in our survey data indicators can be compared with MIKE 
and ETIS for correlations to assist CITES. 
 
Table 2. Countries/territories with CITES dates of accession and dates entered into force, relevant to 
my fieldwork research publications in Appendix 2 
Africa/Middle East Date Asia Date 
Nigeria May/July 1975  India July/Oct 1976 
South Africa July/October 1975 Hong Kong (UK till ‘97) Aug/Oct 1976 
Egypt Jan/Apr 1978 Japan Aug/Nov 1980 
Sudan Oct 1982/Jan 1983 Macau (Portugal till ‘99) Dec 1980/Mar 1981 
Ethiopia Apr/Jul 1989 China January/April 1981 
Yemen Apr/Aug 1997 Philippines Aug/Nov 1981 
Angola  Oct/Dec 2013 Thailand Jan/Apr 1983 
  Vietnam Jan/Apr 1994 
  Myanmar Jun/Sept 1997 





CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
2.1 My research and chosen market survey techniques 
I initially collected data with questionnaires from members of the IUCN SSC African 
Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group (AESRG) compiling numbers and distribution of 
African rhinos in 1983/1984. Poaching had been heavy and we needed to update our 
1980/1981 figures for IUCN. I published my findings with the then Chairman, David 
Western (Western and Vigne 1984, 1985) and carried out research work on elephant carcass 
counts from aerial survey data with Anne Burrill for Iain Douglas-Hamilton (Douglas-
Hamilton and Burrill 1991).  
From 1985 I worked on a WWF International project with the Vice Chair of the AERSG, 
Esmond Martin, to research and close down the international trade in rhino products. I 
focused on investigating North Yemen’s jambiyas (traditional daggers: Cover photograph; 
Fig. 5), the ‘best’ with rhino horn handles, writing many articles (Vigne and Martin 1993a; 
Vigne and Martin 1993c; Martin et al. 1997; Vigne and Martin 2006; Vigne et al. 2007). 
My fieldwork in Yemen from 1986 to 2012 involved market surveys every two or three years 
in Sanaa’s old souk: I was heavily scarved in keeping with Yemeni culture and to help 
disguise me so as not to be recognized by the craftsmen making jambiya handles, in case they 
would hide their horn. I would walk alone to the workshop area deep in the souk through the 
narrow alleyways, looking for rhino horn and rhino horn handles being made. After my count 
and noting the rhino horn workshops, I would then hastily retreat to the safety of the hotel. 
Later Esmond Martin and I separately would count artisans and workshops, to compare for 
accuracy and recount if necessary. We would also survey the retail jambiya market close by 
with a translator to help with pricing as nothing was labelled. We would collect retail price 
data for jambiyas with differing handles, noting new trends on each visit, and have tea and 
talk with rhino horn dealers to update our findings on their trade and to gather general 
information. Some members of the senior family had lived in Mombasa and spoke English, 
giving me information more freely when I began this research. 
Our interpreter, under our direction, would help us collect information on wholesale prices of 
rhino horn, quantities and origin of the horn coming in, current smuggling routes and 
techniques, and the price of left-over chips and shavings that were sold for export to eastern 
Asia, mainly China. On short visits we concentrated our monitoring in Sanaa and on longer 
visits we surveyed the souks in other towns to check jambiya production and sales. Recently, 
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unable to go to the country due to civil war, I collected data through a contact in Yemen on 
WhatsApp (Vigne and Martin 2018c), and I have updated 2020 information (unpublished). 
I also worked with Esmond Martin on his ivory market data, mainly for southern Africa in 
the early 1980s (Martin 1984a,b; 1985a,b; 1986); and after the CITES ban in Zimbabwe 
(Martin 1991), Sudan (Martin 1998) and Egypt (Martin 2000). I did not carry out extensive 
ivory fieldwork in the 1990s or early 2000s, but worked on Esmond Martin’s data, and also 
with Daniel Stiles producing five initial monographs for Save the Elephants including on 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and East Asia (Martin and Stiles 2000; 2002; 2003).  
From about 2009 in Asia and Africa I collected field data on ivory and rhino horn (Box 1), 
sometimes with Esmond Martin for added security as investigations became less safe, but 
sometimes alone, in the same systematic way we had developed for useful comparison, 
updating techniques where appropriate. We could sometimes gather more data when there 
were two of us, one distracting the vendor by asking questions and pricing items, while the 
other counted or took photographs, for example. We recorded the number and types of ivory 
items (in certain locations rhino horn as well) on display for sale, noting also the numbers and 
variety of outlets. I photographed the objects where possible to verify counts. I observed 
items for age and origin of carving. If some were hidden in drawers or back rooms these were 
noted as extras. Starting/ labelled retail prices were recorded as well as the discount vendors 
were prepared to give. If stated in the local currency, we reported prices converted into USD 
at the exchange rate at the time, not corrected for inflation. We also learnt about current 
wages, to put prices of items for sale into context. Often in tourist areas US dollars were 
quoted, especially for expensive items. Where possible we would check the source of the 
ivory (or horn), both raw and worked, obtain wholesale prices for the raw material according 
to size and quality/type of the tusk (or horn), and visit craftsmen in workshops to establish 
trends in the numbers of workshops and artisan numbers (and if they worked full-time or 
part-time and how they were paid). We would note any changes in production and see what 
and how items were produced—by hand or with electric drills, for instance. In the retail 
outlets I recorded the nationality of the traders and customers and, usually through our 
interpreter, asked their views on the trade, documenting substitutes/alternatives as well. 
Unobserved, I would briefly write the data in a small notepad. Vendors in most countries 
became increasingly nervous of possible investigators, so to avoid causing alarm I also 
recorded items secretly taking close up photos with a small camera, and later by iPhone. In 
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the evenings I typed detailed data from my brief notes and photos of that day. And our 
interpreter explained what he had gleaned from conversations with the vendors and buyers.    
We would select a country in Africa or Asia that we understood from friends and colleagues 
had an unregulated market and needed in-depth investigation. Some well-known markets 
required regular updating, such as in Ethiopia (Vigne and Martin 1993d; Vigne and Martin 
and Vigne 2008b,c,d; Martin and Vigne 2010; Vigne 2016/2017). Egypt is known for 
selling mainly older souvenir ivory items (Martin 2000; Martin and Milliken 2005) but we 
found new name seals and beads also being crafted, with similar new items for sale in large 
markets in Nigeria (Martin and Vigne 2013b) and Angola (Svensson et al. 2014b; Vigne 
and Martin 2014a). I maintained a standardized recording system for data comparisons in 
time and space (Vigne 2016/2017). 
Price data and statistical analysis need careful interpretation for worked ivory, for instance 
with antique items or those of artistic merit bringing average prices high. A further limiting 
factor is establishing accurate turnover. Descriptions and photographs taken in different years 
of the same items in the same shops, and interviewing vendors, help, but this remains a 
pursuit to be better clarified for many markets. 
 2.2 Literature review 
Particularly useful over the years for research have been Oryx, Pachyderm, TRAFFIC 
Bulletin and TRAFFIC reports.  With the internet, many papers have been made available, 
revolutionizing this work for both learning about areas to visit for fieldwork and for wildlife 
trafficking information. Academia.edu, Google Scholar, Researchgate, Sci Hub, as well as 
African-elephant-request@elephantnews.org and rhinoresoourcecenter.com are vital sources 
for information using a snowball method for further citations, along with papers and links 
shared from colleagues by email and WhatsApp.   
2.3 Timeline 
I have researched a 40-year period on rhino horn and ivory markets from 1980 to 2020 and 
with decades of experience I have a broad understanding of the consistencies and changes in 
consumer demand and the challenges faced. In numerous countries I carried out fieldwork on 
rhino horn and ivory, with my timeline shown in Table 3. Fieldwork lasted a minimum of a 
week when one location was surveyed (such as Sanaa) to maximum 6 weeks for larger areas, 
such as India. Usually I spent 2–4 weeks collecting data in most of my surveys. 
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Table 3. Timeline showing my main fieldwork  
Date Country   Research (italics = reports in References) Annexes 
1983/84 Kenya Rhino population data collection Annex 1 
1986 India Rhinos, survey on rhino horn uses Annex 7 
1986 North Yemen Studying and curtailing the rhino horn trade Annex 8 
1988 Nepal Chitwan rhinos, rhino product investigations  
1988 Bangladesh Rhino product investigations  
1988 India Rhino product investigations  
1989 India A 6-week survey of the legal ivory trade (pre CITES ban)  
1990 India Ivory trade follow up; rhino poaching study in Assam Annex 9 
1990 Thailand Rhino product trade survey in Bangkok Annex 10 
1990 China Survey of wildlife products for sale in Guangzhou  
1990 Yemen  Rhino horn trade study, WWF International  
1992 Yemen Rhino horn trade survey and law enforcement  
1993 Ethiopia Ivory trade study in Addis Ababa  
1993 Yemen  Closing down the trade in illegal rhino horn Annex 2 
1993 India Assam’s rhino protection  
1995 Yemen Closing down the illegal trade in rhino horn  
1995 India Assam’s rhino anti-poaching study  
1996 Yemen   Arranging the joining of CITES Annex 3 
1997 Tanzania Study of the Kidai rhino population, Selous Game Reserve  
1998 India Assam’s rhino conservation  
1999 Ethiopia Ivory trade survey in Addis Ababa  
1999 Yemen Survey of the rhino horn trade  
2001 Yemen Rhino horn study, including Saada and Sokotra  
2003 Yemen Rhino horn trade monitoring, legislation, education Annex 4 
2005 Thailand, Vietnam Retail Ivory investigation  
2005 Java Rhino conservation in Ujung Kulon National Park  
2007 Yemen Monitoring rhino horn from eastern Africa to Yemen Annex 5 
2008 Hong Kong Elephant and mammoth retail ivory items investigation  
2008 Ethiopia Ivory market survey in Addis Ababa  
2008 Yemen Jambiyas in Yemen and a rhino horn awareness campaign  
2009 Ethiopia Ivory trade study in Addis Ababa Annex 12 
2009 Japan The ivory markets of Osaka and Tokyo   Annex 17 
2011 Southern China A survey of the ivory and mammoth ivory trade Annex 23 
2011 Egypt Ivory carving and retail ivory survey in Cairo and Luxor  Annex 13 
2012 India: Studying rhino conservation strategies in West Bengal  
2012 Nepal Bardia and Suklaphanta rhino study  
2012 Nigeria Ivory trade survey in Lagos   Annex 14 
2012 Yemen  Rhino horn trade study in Yemen and public awareness Annex 6 
2013 Lao PDR Rhino horn and ivory trade and wildlife markets studied Annex 18 
2014 Angola Survey of Luanda’s retail ivory markets Annex 15 
2014 China Ivories and rhino horn in Beijing and Shanghai   Annex 24 
2015 Hong Kong Elephant and mammoth ivory trade survey Annex 25 
2015 Macau Elephant and mammoth ivory trade survey Annex 26 
2015 Philippines Ivory trade survey Annex 19 
2015 China Ivory and rhino horn study in eight cities Annex 27 
2015 Vietnam Ivory and rhino horn survey Annex 20 
2015 Lao PDR Ivory research  
2016 South Africa Rhino horn in South Africa, especially from Kruger  Annex 11 
2016 Lao PDR Ivory and rhino horn trade survey Annex 21 
2017 Sudan Ivory and rhino horn trade in Khartoum/Omdurman Annex 16 
2017 Ethiopia Addis Ababa ivory survey and study Annex 16 
2017 Thailand Ivory in Chatuchak market, Bangkok  
2017 Myanmar Ivory and rhino horn trade study Annex 22 
2018 Japan and China Ivory and mammoth ivory trade studies  
2020 East Myanmar Retail ivory and rhino horn survey  
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2.4 Study areas 
My study areas presented in this thesis took place in markets of major concern regarding 
production and sales of worked rhino horn and ivory (Table 3). In North Yemen (Yemen 
from 1990) I regularly examined Sanaa’s oldest souk (bazaar) buried deep in the ancient 
walled Old City inside the capital. I also surveyed Taiz and Dhamar, both known for jambiya 
making, and various towns as far north as Saada, as far west as the port of Hodeidah and into 
the southern region, notably Aden, Mukalla, Wadi Hadhramaut and Marib. In India and 
Nepal I went to all national parks and reserves with rhinos, especially Assam in northeast 
India with the most rhino protected areas.  
In countries surveyed for their markets, I explored the main cities, tourist sites and resorts 
looking for workshops and retail outlets selling ivory and rhino horn. I concentrated on 
souvenir shops, luxury hotels with gift shops, expensive jewellery or jade shops, arts and 
crafts galleries, antique shops, exhibitions, shopping malls with specialist shops, religious 
outlets, wood shops, dagger/knife shops, Chinese markets, wildlife outlets, pharmacists or 
stalls selling traditional Oriental medicines (Fig. 2), and herbal tea outlets. Surveys were 
generally conducted in the main downtown areas of a city. I returned on later surveys to 
inspect previously visited shops and looked for new outlets. This involved taxis and a lot of 
walking. Taxi drivers sometimes found us new locations when we asked for help to find, for 
example, places carving or selling arts and crafts or traditional medicines (so as not to draw 
attention to our interest in ivory and rhino horn). Generally we had guides who helped us 
locate new workshop and shopping areas as well.  
2.5 Identifying ivory and rhino horn 
I have learned from experience to identify most ivory even in dim light, able to recognize 
styles and origins of a carving and usually whether an item is a genuine antique (pre 1947), 
old (pre 1990), carved recently in the 1990s and early 2000s or more newly carved in the 
previous five years. Ivory is recognizable in cross-section by its cross-hatchings or Schreger 
lines that are obtuse in angle and looser in appearance than mammoth ivory (Espinoza and 
Mann 1999; Baker et al. 2020). It helps to take a photograph and then blow up the image on 
an iPhone or computer to be sure of the Schreger lines. Small ivory items can be confused 
with mammoth ivory unless the outer ‘peel’ of a mammoth tusk (cementum) is present. Other 
ivories do not have Schreger lines. Bone has dots called pits that may collect dust grains due 
to the Havesian canal system in bone (Espinoza and Mann 1999; Baker et al. 2020). Large 
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items cannot be made out of a single bone, as for ivory. Synthetic/resin ivory generally has 
wavy lines. For extremely small beads in an item of jewellery, it is possible to confuse ivory 
with synthetic ivory, generally requiring careful examination and feeling the texture as well 
as using magnifying reading glasses, for example. 
In Yemen it was straightforward to identify a full rhino horn by its distinctive fibrous base 
area, or for an oblong piece of horn by the texture and creamy colouring and the thin strands 
within it. Pieces of horn were sometimes smuggled in foodstuffs, cut into cigarette packet-
sized oblongs for easier disguise. While Yemeni artisans were carving rhino horns I saw that 
they kept a sheet of plastic under the handle being filed, gathering the rhino horn shavings to 
sell. This would not happen with domestic water buffalo horn, Bubalus bubalis, (imported 
cheaply from India) of which the shavings merely fell to the ground. A finished rhino horn 
handle was recognizable by its lizard skin-like appearance that is unique, beiger for a new 
one and darker for an old one. It was important to have a close up view to make certain. 
Another technique was to look at the top edges of the handle for an amber-like translucency if 
held up to a light. 
It was rare to see genuine old rhino horns or rhino horn items in eastern Asia. They were 
nearly all fakes, such as with curious knobbles around their base, and large dark ‘antique’ 
libation cups that were resin-like. Rhino horn is wider towards its base and solid and can be 
distinguished from cow or buffalo horns that are narrower and more hollow (Sims and Yates 
2010). Tips of buffalo horn are difficult to distinguish from rhino horn tips (Tallant et al. 
2010) and can confuse customers, especially common in traditional medicine shops in 
Vietnam (Ammann 2011). New, large rhino horn items, generally produced from horns of the 
white rhino, are nowadays made into standard-looking thick bangles and big plain 
pendants/large slices, beaded items, small Chinese drinking cups etc. These have thin 
filaments and sometimes melanin central patches perhaps with distinctive mottled edges. As 
for left-over chips and shavings used for medicine, these were often in trays of oil or neatly 
kept in small plastic bags or glass bottles with the familiar fibrous texture sometimes with 
part of a hole from bead cutting. Shavings are surprisingly white and can be in thin peels 
from a machine. It was not the cheaper shops, but Chinese shops selling herbal teas, jade or 
other expensive items where you might see rhino horn objects, often behind glass with ivory 
items. Thus knowing where they are likely to be found and their packaging/display 




Over the decades market survey ethical requirements have changed. In our earlier studies, 
such as in Bangkok’s Chinatown in 1990 (Vigne and Martin 1991d) salesmen were happy 
to answer questions. We could openly interview and record our findings in notebooks, 
spending time with artisans, pharmacists and traders at their desks. Dealers and shop owners 
often said they had never before been interviewed by a foreigner and were flattered by our 
attention. Being two of us helped them think we were simply interested tourists, especially 
important in later years. Even as late as 2015 in China, master ivory carvers liked to talk to us 
openly and at length, allowing us to write down their information, wanting to explain about 
their work in which they had great pride as well as confidence about their legal status (Vigne 
and Martin 2017b). Most vendors were glad of our notice in their items for sale. Some 
assumed that we wanted to learn about local handicrafts as writers for a book perhaps, or that 
we were carrying out a market survey with the aim of opening our own jewellery or souvenir 
outlet, for example, and we accepted graciously their usual unwillingness not to disclose 
details of their turnover (Hunt et al. 1984). We played a partially covert role in these 
instances, avoiding too many questions about ourselves, while encouraging an easy rapport 
with dealers and vendors for sometimes lengthy discussions (Li 2008). Only in later years did 
ethical challenges steadily increase requiring more covert investigations (Li 2008). Vendors 
could become overly suspicious and we had to adapt accordingly, keeping notebooks out of 
sight. But undisclosed research has to be accepted as a normal part of academic inquiry 
(Spicker 2011). We were tactful in the way we recorded our findings out of view to avoid 
annoying shop owners and being labelled as ‘wildlife protectionists’ which could result in our 
being told to leave the premises, outlets closing up, and worse. We adjusted, with speedier 
surveying thanks to photographs (asking permission to photograph if appropriate, or taking 
photos covertly if not). Photographs also improved accuracy as a reminder of shops and 
items. In published photographs we generally blurred or blackened faces for people’s privacy. 
We never published names and addresses of those we interviewed, in respect of the right to 
confidentiality. We were of course always polite and generally vendors were polite and 
tolerated us, although we disappointed them by never buying an item of ivory or rhino horn, 
so as not to encourage the market or break the law. 
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CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION 
 
Fig. 5. Our 2007 poster in Yemen: ‘Don’t kill the rhino for a jambiya: Live and let them live too’ 
 
3.1 The rhino horn trade from Africa to Yemen  
In Africa in the 1970s civil wars, an influx of firearms, a breakdown in law and order, weak 
governance, corruption and mismanagement afflicted much of tropical Africa and led to 
increasingly threatening rhino poaching. In the late 1970s rhino populations were declining 
rapidly (Parker and Martin 1979; Hillman and Martin 1979). It was the fast falling number of 
black rhinos in Africa from an estimated 65,000 in 1970 to an estimate of 14,000–15,000 in 
1980, dropping to 8,800 in 1984, from data I compiled for IUCN/SSC AERSG (Western and 
Vigne 1984; 1985) that alarmed conservationists and prompted my research into trade and 




Box 4. Background to Yemen’s rhino horn trade 
Most Yemeni men in the 1980s wore daily a traditional curved dagger / jambiya. Those with a rhino 
horn handle were (and still are) considered the best, and the oldest, most precious daggers are 
known as sayfani. North Yemenis had become rich due to oil in the Gulf and from 1976 to 1980 
Yemen was the major importer of rhino horn, officially importing 3 tonnes a year, 40% of the world 
market. The legal import price over that period rose from USD 100/kg to USD 766/kg (Martin et al. 
1997). The wholesale price in the main market in Sanaa was USD 675/kg in late 1978 (Parker and 
Martin 1979). Although North Yemen banned rhino horn imports in 1982, smuggling continued and 
as rhino populations were being annihilated in tropical Africa, poaching spread southwards into 
Zambia where salesmen mixed real and fake rhino horns to try to fool traders (Martin and Vigne 
1986). Rhinos were wiped out in Zambia for rhino horn due to inadequate anti-poaching patrols 
(Leader-Williams et al. 1990; Vigne and Martin 2018b). 
 
We investigated poaching and smuggling of horn from Africa into the Arabian peninsula in 
the 1980s and early 1990s that involved a number of routes and techniques: from Khartoum 
and Addis Ababa on flights, from Djibouti by sea, or across the desert (Vigne and Martin 
1993a; Martin et al. 1997; Vigne and Martin 2006); Vigne et al. 2007; Vigne and Martin 
2013a). Our Sanaa visits from 1986 onwards involved a three-pronged approach. I would 
survey the souks and talk to the main trader who bought 70–80% of the total: an average of 
1,226 kg/year from Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia from 1980 through 1984, 
and then declining. About 60–70% of the raw horn was ‘discarded’ as chips and shavings for 
export mostly to China, earning the Yemeni traders more to compensate for the rising price of 
the horn. We learned prices for shavings rose from between USD 219–340/kg from 1983 to 
1990 to USD 500/kg in 1993 (Martin et al. 1997) and up to USD 940/kg in 2012.  
Secondly, we would talk to high level officials, notably our friend Dr Abdul Karim al-Iryani 
who was Foreign Minister or Prime Minister or later Adviser to the President. On nearly 
every visit we saw him to discuss our findings, legislation and law enforcement as needed. 
He was always able to make immediate decisions with a phone call to various ministries to 
put into place the legislation we devised together, such as banning re-exports of left-over 
rhino horn, and finally Yemen joining CITES. Meetings with the top decision makers could 
be the fastest way to a solution. For example, as UN Special Envoy to rhinos in 1992 Esmond 
Martin met the ruler of Sharjah, Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, who agreed to funding 
support and to prevent any more endangered wild animals from coming into his Emirate 
(Vigne and Martin 1993b), although funds were often lacking for follow-up work on such 
initiatives. 
Thirdly, we encouraged wildlife education, describing in newspapers and on the Yemeni 
television the plight of the rhino. I arranged the design and distribution of posters (Fig. 5) and 
stickers that were handed out liberally to the public. We made billboards and other notices for 
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the Sanaa and Taiz zoos, choosing the most useful positions and helping put them up 
strategically for the many visitors, so as to publicize the importance of wildlife and the perils 
of rhino survival (Vigne et al. 2007; Vigne and Martin 2013a). We spoke to students 
through contacts at the Sanaa University and other training institutes, lecturing and providing 
written information. We held regular meetings with traders to discuss the use of substitutes. 
We discovered that if the senior trading family approved of a material it would sell. They 
initially sold plastic handles for the same price as rhino horn and this was a success until it 
cracked when dropped or melted with cigarette ash. We encouraged new expensive agate 
handles, as did the President and Foreign Minister (Vigne and Martin 2000), but the senior 
trading family did not promote these as a prestigious substitute for local use because stone 
was not a material they wanted to craft. New look-alike resin Chinese-style handles made in 
more recent years have not been accepted by this family either, but have become popular, as 
well as domestic water buffalo horn, with the many who cannot afford rhino horn. 
From 2003–2007 the wholesale price for raw rhino horn rose from USD 1,200 to USD 1,700 
a kg with horns arriving from some of the last remaining northern white rhinos in Garamba 
National Park in the DRC, all illegally killed by rebels in 2003 and 2004 (Vigne and Martin 
2006); Hillman Smith et al. 2014). We learned from traders in Yemen that rhino horn had 
come from the DRC and Kenya in 2005 and 2006 (Vigne et al. 2007). The Sanaa traders 
obtained about 60–70 kg of African horn a year from 2003 to 2006, according to information 
received (Vigne et al. 2007). From 2000 to 2005 in Africa 252 poached rhinos were recorded 
(Milledge 2007); nearly all horns from eastern Africa were destined for Yemen. 
We made progress on each visit and documented our findings, repeating the same 
methodology of surveying, meeting officials, encouraging substitutes and spreading 
information widely to curb demand for rhino horn. We also produced many academic reports 
and popular articles in reputable publications to reach a wider audience and to encourage 
more support for Yemen: Martin 1985c; Martin 1987; Vigne and Martin 1987b; Vigne and 
Martin 1991a,c; Vigne and Martin 1993a; Vigne and Martin 1993c; Martin and Vigne 
1995b; Vigne and Martin 1995b; Martin et al. 1997; Martin and Vigne 1997b; Vigne and 
Martin 2000; Vigne and Martin 2001; Martin and Vigne 2003; Vigne and Martin 2006; 
Martin and Vigne 2007a,b; Vigne et al. 2007; Vigne and Martin 2013a,b); Vigne and 
Martin 2018c.  
When the economic boom ended, most men could not afford new rhino horn jambiyas after 
Unification in 1990 and the Gulf war in 1991 during which many lost their lucrative jobs. 
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During the civil war that broke out between north and south Yemen in 1994, we were in 
Sanaa and were hurriedly evacuated—so our progress at that time came to nothing. And since 
2014 fighting against the Houthi tribal rebels has made it impossible to re-visit and has 
destroyed Yemen’s economy. ‘Aid’ money going into corrupt pockets, however, has 
maintained a demand by a small ‘elite’ (anonymous, Yemeni resident, pers. comm., February 
2020). Wars make a few rich, so the trade has not collapsed.   
There have been hardly any other major reports on Yemen’s rhino horn and jambiya industry, 
except for one for the US government (Varisco1987) that stressed the general need for US 
action in conservation efforts and development in North Yemen, as well as help in finding an 
alternative to rhino horn handles. Rhino horn jambiyas were also worn just north in Saudi 
Arabia, made in Yemen and repaired locally, but this was not a significant market (Vigne and 
Martin 2000). A gap in our research is Oman, as daggers called khanjar of a slightly different 
style are worn there too, with some rich Omanis traditionally preferring rhino horn. I saw a 
new expensive one being worn in Muscat in August 2007. This could be a threat to rhinos if 
new handles are still being made—unlike the old Bedouin daggers for sale as artefacts that I 
saw, for example, in a boutique shop in Dubai in 2014 where the European shop owner 
thought they were all of water buffalo horn.  
In Sanaa’s old souk, for regular monitoring of the hidden-away workshops and stalls, it 
helped knowing the outlets well in order to find them on each survey for accurate 
comparisons, as the winding, narrow alleyways are confusing with most stalls not named or 
numbered. It also helped to know the traders and be a friendly female foreigner as dealers 
liked to show off their knowledge, liberally sharing information. Wildlife is not a priority in a 
developing country riddled with other problems where there is smuggling of many goods. A 
non-native animal is not considered a concern, rather the responsibility of the native country. 
It was thus important that we shared our data with a supportive and well-educated top 
politician who could make decisions quickly. We also learned the pitfalls of law enforcement 
in a developing country such as Yemen with government officials changing positions 
frequently. We met other influential people including the Grand Mufti who at our request 
wrote an important fatwa that ‘it was against the will of God to kill rhinos for their horns’ 
(Vigne and Martin 2000). But we learned that in dealing with consumer demand, it was the 
senior trading family whose expert opinion counted the most.  
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3.2 The rhino horn trade to eastern Asia  
Horns from all five species of rhinos have long been in demand widely in eastern Asia 
making it particularly difficult to halt trade entirely. In the 1980s and 1990s I researched the 
poaching in India, focusing on Assam which has the largest numbers of greater one-horned 
rhinos. The people of the Indian subcontinent, notably India and Nepal, have a long cultural 
connection with their rhinos (Divyabhanusinh et al. 2018). This charismatic animal has 
fascinated people for centuries. Many were kept in captivity in India and transported to 
Europe and elsewhere for people’s ‘entertainment’ (Rookmaaker 1998; Rookmaaker et al. 
1998). Nevertheless, most were hunted for sport to near extinction by the end of the 19th 
century (Vigne and Martin 2018b).  
In India by 1980 with careful protection thanks to both State and Central government 
commitment and funding, populations recovered to 1,250 rhinos. Then suddenly from 1982 
to 1985 poachers killed a minimum of 233 rhinos in Assam (Martin et al. 1987; Martin and 
Vigne 1989a). This was mostly due to political unrest. From 1986 to 2012 on a number of 
visits to India and Nepal we interviewed senior staff and patrollers, studying reasons for 
successes and failures in their efforts to prevent rhino poaching. We also collated data on 
illegal killing. For example, in Assam, poachers acquired automatic weapons, or used silent 
pit traps, and  also power lines to electrocute rhinos (Vigne and Martin 1991b; Vigne and 
Martin 1994a; Martin et al. 2009a,b). Nepal struggled with serious political disturbances, 
reducing rhino numbers considerably during those periods (Martin et al. 2008/2009). 
Nevertheless, with commitment from the top, competent management, effective intelligence 
systems and local involvement, numbers in Nepal recovered (Martin et al. 2013a). Small, 
highly protected areas are safest, combined with good relations with the local people living 
beside the park/buffer zones, who benefit financially (Martin and Vigne 1995a; Vigne and 
Martin 1995a; Vigne and Martin 2004). Dedicated field staff, good leadership, high Park 
budgets, and community support have also kept poaching down in India, seeing rhino 
numbers rise (Martin and Vigne 1996; Vigne and Martin 1998, Vigne and Martin 2012).  The 
Indian subcontinent, despite many challenges, developed methods to protect rhinos and other 
wildlife with little financial help from the global community for wildlife conservation 
(Thekaekara 2020). There are lessons to learn for Africa (Martin and Vigne 2012a; Vigne and 
Martin 2012; Vigne and Martin 2018b), especially today as eastern Asian markets have 





Box 5. Background to eastern Asia’s rhino horn trade 
Between 1969 and 1976 the official average export of rhino horns from Kenya represented 1,197 
rhinos annually. Most horns went to Hong Kong followed by Japan (Parker and Martin 1979). Japan 
imported rhino horn for traditional Japanese medicine as did Hong Kong which re-exported much to 
South Korea for sale in their ‘Oriental medicine clinics’. In the early 1980s the Philippines was the 
only Asian country that prohibited its non-Chinese citizens from using these, because the animal 
products and herbs had not undergone rigorous modern testing and could pose a health hazard 
(Martin 1983). Hong Kong and Japan stopped importing rhino horn in 1979 and 1980 respectively 
when joining CITES (Martin 1983). They had the legal capacity to enforce their laws with law 
abiding citizens who normally complied and accepted substitutes, so demand subsided. In the early 
1980s, as the economies grew in other eastern Asian countries, so did their consumption of rhino 
horn. 
South Korea banned imports in 1983 with final legislation passed in 1985 (Martin and Vigne 1987) 
but trade continued, with rhino horn sold mostly as an ingredient in Chung Shim Won (medicine for 
purifying the heart) ‘balls’ taken as a tonic. The ‘balls’ contained 30 ingredients, including rhino horn 
(Song and Milliken 1990). Despite rhino horn on the world market (over 95% from Africa) halving in 
quantity from 1979 to 1982 as rhinos numbers shrank, the average wholesale prices for rhino horn 
in eastern Asia remained stable at USD 550/kg for African horn and USD 9,000/kg for Asian horn; 
retail prices increased only 8.5% despite the sharp decline in imports (Martin 1983). In Singapore, 
for example, in 1982/1983 the retail price for African rhino horn was USD 9,876/kg and Asian rhino 
horn USD 19,170/kg (Martin 1983), much smuggled in from Assam (Martin et al. 1987). After 
considerable pressure, Singapore banned its imports and exports of rhino horn in October 1986 as 
had Macau 10 months earlier, having previously been a major entrepôt for African and Asian rhino 
horn for China’s government to make medicines for export (Martin 1989b).  
Taiwan traders, despite an import ban by 1985, became the biggest importers of African horn, 
buying most from poached rhinos from Zimbabwe through Taiwanese trade connections in South 
Africa (Vigne and Martin 1989). Some Taiwanese wished to spend their wealth on valuable wildlife 
purchases, and stockpiled horns for China’s government medicine factories (ACET 2019). In the 
late 1980s traders in Taiwan paid double the Yemen wholesale price: USD 2,486/kg (Vigne and 
Martin 1989). Following international pressure, with Esmond Martin as UN Special Envoy for 
rhinos, and the hard work of the CITES Secretariat and the US government, this trade was finally 
ended. The threat of US trade sanctions on wildlife through the so-called Pelly amendment on 
Taiwan and also China in 1993, worked. Both countries effectively ceased their domestic rhino horn 
trade (Vigne and Martin 1994c; ACET 2019). Thus, rhino populations in the few countries in Africa 
where they still survived (mainly Kenya, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) slowly recovered 
(Emslie et al. 2019).  
 
I first surveyed Bangkok’s traditional Chinese medicine shops in early 1990. There I saw a 
greater one-horned rhino horn on view for sale offered at USD 36,500/kg retail and skin for 
USD 2,000/kg retail, despite Thailand’s international ban since 1983 (Vigne and Martin 
1991d). Sumatran rhino products, prohibited in Thailand since 1972, were more commonly 
available with fresh carcasses obtained from poachers in the region before their local 
extinction. Retail, Sumatran rhino horn was then USD 16,300/kg retail. In the late 1980s 
Martin (1989a) conducted a survey in northern Borneo of Sumatran rhino horn for sale, and 
fresh products were then available from poachers, and sold to other locations in eastern Asia. 
Now, only a very few rhinos survive in Indonesia. In Vietnam the lesser one-horned / Javan 
rhinos were all poached by 2010, the remnant population having been discovered and made 
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known to the world only in 1988 (Rademeyer 2012; Vigne and Martin 2018b). In late 2019 
a rich man living in Singapore explained to me that some newly ultra rich Chinese there 
today pay whatever money can buy, such as for Sumatran or Javan rhino horn, wanting the 
rarest (and most shocking) commodities. In contrast, Singapore’s established Chinese 
community has been moving away from ivory items (Webber et al. 2013), considering them 
passé, especially the younger generation who have a growing conservation ethic. 
In the early 2000s, organized crime was growing between traders in eastern Asia and Africa 
(Emslie et al. 2007; Milledge 2007), which flared up with 83 rhinos killed in South Africa in 
2008, peaking in 2015 at 1,175 (Milliken and Shaw 2012; Vigne and Martin 2018b). South 
Africa is home to the greatest number of rhinos in the world (Emslie et al. 2019), and 
poachers from poor Mozambican villages near the border with Kruger National Park were 
often easily coerced to poach by middlemen acting like ‘Robin Hood’ bringing money to the 
villages (Hubschle 2016; Hubschle and Shearing 2018). As Kruger staff got funds and 
support to increase their patrols along Kruger’s long boundary with Mozambique, more 
poachers then entered Kruger from the west, as field staff explained to us in 2016. With 
poaching and smuggling abetted by corruption in South Africa, poachers were often aided by 
bribed Kruger employees (‘inside jobs’), using the Park gates (Vigne and Martin 2018b; 
Scott 2020).  
Criminal networks can move their operations around quickly, outwitting police intelligence. 
In Namibia, despite its excellent community conservation track record with rhino populations 
growing well since the 1980s (Martin 1993), there was a recent poaching scourge, followed 
by northern Botswana in 2019/2020 with rhinos illegally killed in extensive areas (Naro et al. 
2019; Somerville 2020). ‘Diplomats’ from Vietnam, North Korea and elsewhere with 
diplomatic immunity, remain an added challenge (Rademeyer 2012; Rademeyer 2016a,b; 
ACET 2019; Ndlovu 2019). Although far greater attention has been focused on preventing 
smuggling of rhino horn in recent years (Moneron et al. 2017) well-protected criminal 
networks encourage poaching in large areas more difficult to patrol, especially if the 
‘custodians’ of the rhinos, the local communities do not benefit in any material way 
(Somerville 2020), and particularly if the judicial system becomes flawed as in South Africa 
reported in the media (Walker and Walker 2017; Neme 2020).  
What has been driving the significant poaching once again? From about 2008 citizens of 
Vietnam and mainland China had, hitherto unavailable, disposable cash to spend on prestige 
purchases such as rhino horn, famous in traditional Chinese and Vietnamese medicine (TCM 
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and TVM)  (Milliken and Shaw 2012). And later, to meet new demand in Vietnam criminal 
networks operating within South Africa began producing rhino horn beads and bracelets and 
big sliced rhino horn ‘pendants’, as well as packaged off-cuts and powder to evade detection 
at airports and sell to the new buyers in eastern Asia (Moneron et al. 2017). In 2016 I carried 
out fieldwork in Kruger, the main rhino horn ‘producing’ end, and studied during several 
years certain markets in eastern Asia, the chief ‘consuming’ end. We interviewed dealers, 
artisans and vendors and found on open display for retail sale newly mass-produced rhino 
horn items (especially plain bangles and large beaded bracelets) with no artistic merit, unlike 
the carvings of past China dynasties (Chapman 1999), plus left-over pieces/shavings for 
TCM. We saw most on retail sale in Vietnam, Lao PDR and Myanmar mainly in Chinese 
shops for Chinese customers. Wholesale prices for raw horn had shot up in Vietnam from 
USD 20,000/kg in 2010 to a peak of USD 65,000/kg in 2012/2013, halving in late 2015, and 
falling further to USD 20,000 and to USD 19,000/kg in Indochina in 2016/2017 (Vigne and 
Martin 2018b). Prices then fell to an average of USD 17,852/kg in 2018 (WJC 2018). There 
are now tightened restrictions on shop sales, but an underground illegal trade continues 
(UNODC 2020). Encouragingly in the first six months of 2020, rhino poaching in South 
Africa decreased by more than half compared with 2019, thanks to the work of all those 
protecting rhinos (Creecy 2020), including the private sector, and also due to COVID-19 
quarantine/‘lockdown’ restricting movement. Furthermore, Kruger’s gates were shut, 
resulting in fewer ‘visitors’ involved in poaching (Scott 2020).  
Today’s eastern Asian consumer demand has been studied increasingly in the field, with an 
array of important publications. These include: Ammann (2011, 2013), Liu (2015) and Stoner 
et al. (2017) investigating sales of new rhino horn and ivory items near Hanoi; Gao et al. 
(2016) on the previous loophole of China’s auctions of old rhino horn items from 2003 to late 
2011; Crosta et al. (2017) investigating the cross-border trade and worked rhino horn sales 
between Vietnam and China; and Shepherd et al. (2018) on the open sale of rhino horn in 
Mong La, Myanmar, on the China border.  
Bribery and corruption continue to sustain smuggling and illegal trade. But rhinos can thrive 
in well-funded, well managed and safeguarded areas, such as in an ‘intensive protection 
zone’.  With enduring support from the top of governments and local community 
involvement, plus a high density of manpower in rhino areas (as in India and Nepal with as 
many as one person/km2), success in reversing the overall decline in rhino numbers can be 
accomplished. Intelligence has been especially effective in preventing poaching in India and 
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Nepal (Martin and Vigne 2013a), and covert work can reveal urgent information on 
smuggling and consumer markets in eastern Asia (Liu et al. 2015; Crosta et al. 2017). 
3.3 Ivory markets on the African continent 
In the early 1980s, official figures showed that raw ivory trade from Africa to Asia was 
mounting significantly (Parker and Martin 1982; 1983). There were also well-established 
legal ivory carving industries in Africa. I helped with publications of Esmond Martin’s 
fieldwork on these ivory industries in southern Africa: Botswana (Martin 1984a), Malawi 
(Martin 1985b), South Africa (Martin 1985a), Zambia (Martin 1986), and Zimbabwe (Martin 
1984b). This work showed that Zimbabwe had the largest ivory industry in the region with 
most tusks available from culling operations. There was a sharp rise in the price of ivory from 
1972 to 1978 on the world market, and Zambia became a target for elephant poaching, with 
tonnes of tusks illegally imported into Zimbabwe (Martin 1984b; 1986). To rectify such 
abuses, CITES established an ivory quota system in 1986 for elephant range states; but 
Burundi was not a CITES Party until 1988 and became a major entrepôt for illegal trade 
(Somerville 2016). In 1989 due to intense pressure for stronger action to save threatened 
elephant populations on the continent, CITES member states voted the African elephant onto 
Appendix I at CITES CoP 7 in Lausanne (Switzerland). This ban initially helped to reduce 
poaching in much of Africa but affected Zimbabwe badly (Martin 1991) and other countries 
with well-managed elephant populations, which led to two so-called one-off auctions of ivory 
from southern Africa (Box 6).  
  
Box 6. One-off ivory auctions 
At the1992 CoP8 meeting in Kyoto (Japan), some southern African countries requested a ‘split-
listing’ to get their elephants put back onto Appendix II. Barnes (1996) amongst others argued that 
in Botswana, numbers of elephants were rising considerably and that a continued ban would 
jeopardize them as the country needed funds for their management programme. Japan, Europe 
and the USA, the main markets, had effectively prohibited their imports following the CITES ban in 
1990, due to competent law enforcement and awareness campaigns. Researchers tried to examine 
the impact of the ban objectively (Dublin and Jachmann 1992; Dublin et al. 1995). Debates to keep 
the ban or not have raged. In 1999 certain southern African countries were permitted to hold 
CITES-approved ivory auctions to one well-managed customer/user, Japan. Japanese traders then 
bought nearly 50 tonnes of ivory from Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
Regular elephant status reports were presented to CITES from the IUCN African Elephant 
Database. In some regions poaching was a serious threat to elephant populations, but not so in 
others e.g. much of southern Africa. By 2007 Africa’s elephant numbers were estimated to be 
between 470,000 and 690,000 (Barnes et al. 1999; Blanc et al. 2007). In late 2008 there was 
permitted by CITES a second ‘one off’ auction from certain southern African countries to traders 
from Japan and China—because China had improved law enforcement with a strict licensing 
process (O’Connell-Rodwell and Parry-Jones 2002). Traders from Japan bought nearly 40 tonnes 
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of the biggest and best tusks from Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and also South Africa, and 62 
tonnes were bought by China (Vigne and Martin 2010a; Vigne and Martin 2010b). The average 
price received was only USD 157/kg while the wholesale price for illegal ivory in much of Asia was 
about USD 800/kg at the time (CITES 2002). China was not able to deal with the fast growing 
demand, and illegal ivory consumption then soared (Vigne and Martin 2014b). 
In the 2000s, yet again there was heavy elephant poaching in tropical Africa. Between 2010 and 
2012 the forest elephants of central Africa were most in danger (Maisels et al. 2013; Wittemyer et 
al. 2014). The African Elephant Status Report 2016 recorded a decline in elephant numbers overall 
in the 37 African range states with continental poaching levels above the sustainability threshold  
from 2010 to 2015 in Africa (Thouless et al. 2016). No CITES-approved auctions have been held 
since 2008. 
 
My research in Sudan in 2017 showed that where elephant populations have been heavily 
depleted in South Sudan, poachers had been killing families with small calves 
indiscriminately to meet Chinese demand for any sizes of tusks. In Khartoum and Omdurman 
I found the majority of polished tusks on display for sale were small, from very young 
elephants (Fig 4). Chinese customers were happy to buy them, vendors remarked (Vigne 
2016/2017; Vigne 2018) and shop owners I interviewed confirmed that nowadays, indeed 
whole families of elephants were being killed in the region. Large tusks from old male 
elephants were no more—they had been used up mainly for chopsticks, I was told. The 
enormous herds of elephants in South Sudan, as I had seen in 1983, had gone (Martin 1998; 
Martin and Vigne 2005).  
I have carried out ivory market surveys in Africa since the early 1990s when I saw very big 
carved tusks in Ethiopia (Vigne and Martin 1993d). I also worked on Esmond Martin’s 
survey results after the CITES ivory ban when trade reduced (Martin 1998; Martin 2000; 
Martin and Stiles 2000, Stiles and Martin 2001). In the 2000s my fieldwork included 
investigating some of the largest growing unregulated ivory markets on the African continent. 
I found that rapidly rising numbers of Chinese construction workers were the main buyers 
and were dictating a shift in production from African figures to Chinese-preferred plain 
jewellery and name seals that were fast to produce, relatively cheap and easy to smuggle 
home. We published our findings widely (Vigne and Martin 2008b,c,d;  Martin and Vigne 
2010; Martin and Vigne 2011a; Martin and Vigne 2012b; Martin and Vigne 2013b; Martin 
and Vigne 2014; Vigne and Martin 2014a; Vigne 2016/2017). Our data indicators portrayed 
the scale of these unregulated markets in Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan which 
needed their governments to enforce their own laws. We learned in Johannesburg at CITES 
CoP17 in 2016 that our publications led to efforts to close or regulate some of these open 
markets, notably in Angola.   
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Other detailed studies of ivory markets in Africa have contributed to curbing illegal trade. 
These include Courable et al. (2003) who re-surveyed Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal and Nigeria, 
finding more ivory than elephants. And Nkoke et al. (2017) surveyed the main markets of 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon 
between 2007 and 2017 and counted 12,964 ivory items in 244 outlets. Most were in 
Kinshasa. They found an increasing production of semi-worked ivory for the Chinese market. 
The most encouraging improvement has been in Ethiopia with a downward trend in ivory 
items on view in the retail outlets, due to regular confiscations (Milledge and Abdi 2005); 
none was seen in 2016 (Vigne 2016/2017). In Ghana, police raids in Accra in 2009 then 
stopped vendors selling ivory items. Martin (2010) counted only 10 items on display in an art 
gallery in July 2010. Items I have surveyed and percentages of the main items (Tables 4 and 
5) point to Lagos and Luanda lacking internal trade controls the most at that time. A recent 
study on wholesale raw tusk prices in West and southern Africa by the Wildlife Justice 
Commission (WJC 2020c) point to a price drop from July 2017 to July 2020 by as much as 
50% (USD 208/kg to USD 92/kg) with a surplus of tusks for sale, suggesting a fall in 
demand. 
 
Table 4. Numbers of retail outlets and ivory items on view in African markets, 2009–2017 
City Date Retail outlets (no.) Ivory items (no.) Items/outlet (no.) 
Addis Ababa Jul 2009 37 1,068 29 
Cairo Mar 2011 71 8,343 118 
Luxor Apr 2011 23 918 40 
Lagos Sept 2012 36 14,349 399 
Luanda March 2014 36 10,888 302 
Khartoum Apr 2017 27 4,278 158 
Omdurman Apr 2017 29 2,795 96 
Total 9 years 259 42,639 165 
Source: surveys by LV (details in publications, Annexes 12,13,14,15,16) 
 
Table 5. Percentages of main ivory items displayed for sale in Africa, 2009–2017 
Country Location Item and percentage 
Ethiopia Addis Ababa Ring 28%, Figurine 20%, Bangle 18% 
Egypt Cairo Figurine 36%, Bead 11%, Scarab beetle 10% 
 Luxor Figurine 47%, Pendant 12%, Obelisk 9% 
Nigeria  Lekki Market Earrings pair 30%, Pendant 26%, Necklace 9% 
Angola Benfica Market Necklace 23%, Bangle 19%, Pendant 19% 
 Central Luanda  Bangle 25%, Necklace 25%, Figurine 17% 
Sudan Omdurman/Khartoum Pendant 41%, Bangle 23%, Figurine 8% 
Source: surveys by LV (details in publications, Annexes 12,13,14,15,16) 
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3.4 Ivory markets in eastern Asia 
3.4.1 Eastern Asia 
Between 1976 and 1980 Hong Kong and Japan imported 83% of Africa’s official exports of 
tusks. Japan preferred the largest forest elephant tusks known as hard ivory. In the early 
1980s Hong Kong was using an average of 668 tonnes a year and Japan about 270 tonnes a 
year (Martin 1983). Hong Kong’s ivory was carved mostly for European and American 
customers (Fig. 6) (Caldwell and Luxmoore 1990). Japan’s ivory was designed for the 
Japanese market, except for some of the artistic hand-carved netsuke (tiny figurine toggles) 
for collectors abroad (Martin 1985d). The Japanese ivory industry, from our fieldwork and 
discussions with traders and Japanese consumers, has shown a decline in demand for ivory 
items (Vigne and Martin 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Vigne 2019 unpublished). Japan’s domestic 
ivory trade remains legal with 80% for name seals / signature stamps (hanko), and the rest 
mainly for traditional uses such as musical instrument parts and traditional tea ceremony 
implements (Vigne and Martin 2010a; 2010b, 2010c). Having interviewed the traders in 
Tokyo and Osaka in 2009 and again in late 2018 and assessed ivory items, I found retail 
prices seen in the same specialist outlets were mainly stable and turnover extremely slow 
with many of the same items on view. The fashion for buying big and best tusks for 
investment, as in the 1970s and 1980s when the Japanese economy was booming, ended, and 
most Japanese no longer want to buy ivory. But an important much smaller trade remains for 
traditional ivory items.  
The Philippines has a history of carving ivory santos or saints for Catholics to worship 
(Martin et al. 2011) and I saw large new santos for sale with ivory heads and hands in 2015 
carved from illegally acquired ivory (Vigne 2016), just after the visit of the Pope to Manila. 
There was no sign in Manila of new items to meet old local Chinese demand.  
With sales fuelled by China’s economic growth, it has been in Indochina where we found 
most illegal worked ivory in the markets where law enforcement, including on cross-border 
trade, is most needed: Vietnam, Lao PDR and Myanmar are on the border with China. This 
region is notorious for wildlife products being traded unsustainably and illegally (World 
Bank 2005; Nijman 2009) and law enforcement remains a major challenge. I counted a 
profusion of new ivory items of Chinese style on display for sale from illegal shipments of 
tusks smuggled from Africa, mostly landing at ports on the long Vietnam coast (Vigne 
2013a; Vigne and Martin 2016a; Vigne and Martin 2017a; Vigne and Martin 2018a). 
Vietnam’s relatively cheap labour and carving tradition inherited from China (Vigne and 
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Martin 2016a) enabled an illegal ivory carving industry and trade to accelerate alarmingly, 
mostly for Chinese consumption. 
Myanmar had a centuries-old legal domestic ivory carving industry, using ivory from the 
abundant captive elephant population working in the past in Myanmar’s logging industry 
(Martin and Vigne 1997a; Martin and Stiles 2002; Vigne and Martin 2002; Shepherd 2002; 
Stiles 2004b). Surveys by Shepherd (2002) and Shepherd and Nijman (2008) found 
considerable numbers of local souvenir ivory articles on sale to foreigners in Myanmar. The 
town of Mong La beside the China border became a hub for wildlife trade where Nijman and 
Shepherd counted more than 3,300 ivory items in early 2014, much carved outside 
Myanmar—which they publicized on social media that drew a large response and attention to 
the problem (Nijman and Shepherd 2014a,b). But smuggling and open exhibits continue, and 
from my surveys in late 2017 (Vigne and Martin 2018a) and early 2020 (Vigne and Nijman 
in prep.) many objects processed from new African ivory apparently are transported into 
Myanmar from the ‘Golden Triangle’ area near the Mekong River where Thailand, Lao PDR 
and China meet. Chinese vendors in 2020 were openly displaying items, but they lamented 
that Chinese customers were few with dwindling visitors due to increased border travel 
restrictions. 
Lao PDR did not have a traditional ivory carving industry, but in 2013 I inspected several 
shops selling ivory and found a new large Chinese ivory specialist shop (Vigne 2013a; Vigne 
2013b). Numbers of Chinese outlets with ivory items rose sharply in the following three 
years (Vigne and Martin 2016a) with Chinese computer-driven machines carving ivory for 
sale to Chinese customers to take/smuggle home. The wholesale price for average tusks 
reached USD 2,000 a kg in late 2013 as the market grew but it fell to USD 715/kg in late 
2016 with a surplus of raw material and thus slower retail sales (retail prices remained largely 
stable). In Cambodia the domestic trade was very slight in 2013 with tiny ivory amulets 
carved for Cambodians (Martin and Martin 2013), and a small growth in 2015/2016 (Nguyen 
and Frechette 2017). But ivory is now being processed, also with computer-driven machines 
into the common Chinese style oblong pendants (6cm x 4cm) for the Chinese market (WJC 
2020a); thus trade continues to find illegal avenues in the region.  
Thailand used to have an extensive ivory carving industry of souvenir trinkets for tourists 
(Martin and Stiles 2002). Carvers worked both Asian and African ivory. Following much 
pressure, and with help from TRAFFIC, shops displaying worked ivory in Bangkok have 
essentially closed down (Krishnasamy et al. 2016b). Most of the shops that I surveyed in 
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Bangkok’s famous Chatuchak market in late 2017 and in Chiang Mai in January 2020 no 
longer displayed ivory for tourists. This shows that visible trade controls are possible. 
There has been a growth in field research on ivory in eastern Asia, all calling for better law 
enforcement where most needed – for example in the 1990s: Martin (1992a) in Vietnam; 
Martin (1992b) in Lao PDR; Martin and Phipps (1996) in Cambodia; Martin and Stiles 
(2002; 2003) in eastern Asia. And later: Shepherd and Nijman (2008) in Myanmar; Stiles 
(2008) in Vietnam; Stiles (2009a,b) in Thailand and Vietnam; Ammann (2011; 2013) in 
Vietnam; Nijman and Shepherd (2012a,b) in Lao PDR; Martin and Martin (2013) in 
Cambodia; Nijman and Shepherd (2014a,b) in Myanmar; Nijman (2014) in Thailand. And 
also: EIA (2015) in Lao PDR; Nguyen and Williamson (2015) in Vietnam; Krishnasamy et 
al. (2016b) in Bangkok, Thailand; Kitade and Toko (2016) and Kitade and Nishono (2017) in 
Japan; Nguyen and Frechette (2017) in Cambodia; and more recently in Vietnam (EIA 2018); 
and Cambodia (WJC 2020a); as well as my work presented in this thesis, and so on.  
3.4.2 China 
In 2002, China had emerged as the chief ivory carving centre in all of Asia with both legal 
and the most extensive illegal ivory industry. It was the main destination for illicit African 
ivory (Martin and Stiles 2003; Stiles and Martin 2003). The government then introduced a 
strict identification system for ivory produced in licensed factories and retail outlets to allow 
only a legal market. China was thus permitted by CITES Parties to partake in the second 
CITES-approved auctions (Box 3) held in southern Africa in 2008 (Martin and Vigne 
2011b). On a survey in southern China in early 2011 we learned that some licensed ivory 
carving factories were not getting enough legal ivory for their carvers (Vigne and Martin 
2011a,b; Martin and Vigne 2011b). The China State Forest Administration allocated legal 
tusks to 37 registered ivory carving factories and although a study of these showed that the 
carvings matched their legal output and illegal ivory was not being laundered into the legal 
ivory system, there could have been an autonomous illegal factory network using illegal ivory 
(Moyle and Conrad 2014). Indeed, I saw that some of the licensed retail outlets had 
inconsistencies with identification cards not always identical to the item. It appeared that 
some vendors were reusing ID cards, as it was not compulsory for the customer to keep the 
card (Vigne and Martin 2014b:). By 2015 vendors in licensed outlets said they were 
disillusioned about the future with few customers as most were more thrifty and merely 
window-shopped; and the state-owned outlets were not replacing ivory items when sold, 
instead selling other goods, anticipating the domestic ban (Vigne and Martin 2017b).  
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My fieldwork found that wholesale prices for 1–5 kg tusks in China rose from USD 750/kg in 
2010 peaking in early 2014 at USD 2,100/kg, and fell to USD 1,100/kg by late 2015 with 
illegal prices only slightly undercutting legal prices (Martin and Vigne 2011b; Vigne and 
Martin 2014b; 2017b). Poaching and the trade continued nevertheless, and smartphones and 
online sales enabled easier cheaper sales of illegal items without the bureaucracy and expense 
of ID cards or shop overheads (Vigne and Martin 2017b). The President of China, Xi 
Jinping, on 31 December 2017 banned all domestic ivory trade, following international 
pressure to do so and having given a year’s warning. Thus ended legal, but not illegal, trade. 
Wholesale prices in the region were stable from late 2015 to December 2017 at about USD 
770–880/kg  (Vigne and Martin 2017a).  Despite analysis and discussion, smuggled ivory, 
much processed from Indochina into China, continues (UNODC 2020). 
In Hong Kong in January 2015 I counted large numbers of ivory objects with many small 
items that could not be easily dated by appearance, but they were legal in registered shops 
permitted to sell off their old stock, i.e. pre the 1990 CITES ban. Huge crowds of Chinese 
shoppers from the mainland were the main customers (Martin and Vigne 2015). Hong Kong 
in 1991 had a model of law enforcement that worked well (Milliken 1991), and the trade 
remained mostly legitimate as survey work showed a decade later (Martin and Martin 2011). 
A few Chinese traders, unable to import any more elephant ivory, started importing in the 
1990s mammoth ivory, thousands of years old, from Russia’s melting summer tundra (Martin 
2006). Expensive legal shops in Hong Kong display intricately carved mighty mammoth 
tusks and tusk pieces recognizable by their brown outer peel and dark fissures (Martin and 
Vigne 2015). Most are carved in factories legally in Guangzhou and Fuzhou as I have seen 
(with elephant ivory (Fig.1)), legally on display for sale in all 10 cities I have surveyed in 
China (Martin and Vigne 2011b; Vigne and Martin 2014b; Vigne and Martin 2017b). 
During research (unpublished), I also counted thousands of mammoth ivory items in late 
2018 in Guangzhou’s jade market. Many stalls specialized in legal mammoth ivory including 
small trinkets that are difficult to distinguish from elephant ivory and need to be verified in 
greater detail. Vendors prefer selling mammoth ivory because it is legal, they explained. Most 
sales are conducted by smartphone orders nowadays. There was a lot of newly carved 
material. Unlike in Hong Kong where official import statistics are readily available as I 
collected there in January 2015 (Hong Kong government 1992–2014), the figures for raw 
mammoth tusk/pieces entering China are not available. In Hong Kong 54 tonnes were 
officially imported in 2014 alone (Martin and Vigne 2015), and tonnes have been entering 
 42 
China annually, according to dealers, and need controls and clear management as discussed at 
CITES CoP18 in 2019 so as not to launder elephant ivory in China. 
In January 2015 in Macau I saw few ivory items, in contrast to Hong Kong and China. Most 
was old stock with none in the new luxury shops in the lavish Macau casinos where clothes 
from top international brands were for sale to their rich mainly Chinese clientele (Martin 
and Vigne 2016). Hong Kong is the place with a reputation for easily available ivory items 
(Fig. 6), so customers busy in Macau as casino goers not as shoppers, would not choose such 
items from a smaller selection there (Table 6). Other important studies have been recently 
conducted on the ivory trade in China and its territories, notably Gao and Clark’s work 
(2014) on trends and drivers for mainland China, and in Hong Kong considerable research is 
now done on illegal wildlife smuggling and trade (ADMCF 2018). The TRAFFIC Offices 
also have produced useful reports and updates (Chou 2018; Xiao 2018).  
Despite ivory’s cultural importance, with patrons of the arts for centuries encouraging 
carvers, China intends to maintain its domestic ivory trade ban, as officials expressed at 
CITES CoP18 in Geneva in 2019. The legal trade had become a thorn in China’s side. Hong 
Kong, also as a result of publicity and international pressure, agreed to end its legal domestic 
ivory trade (all supposedly old stock) on 31 December 2021 (Thomas 2018). Hong Kong, 
nowadays, is a significant entrepôt for illegal ivory shipments destined for China (ADMCF 
2018). A ban will thus simplify enforcement by Customs and in shops (Bennett 2015), 
although the corrupt underground trade can flourish with criminal networks having the 
monopoly (Smith et al. 2015). Monitoring and law enforcement will be needed in Hong Kong 
before and even more after the planned 2021domestic ivory trade ban to monitor trends 
(Tables 6 and 7). 
Fig.6. An ivory animal figurine of 7.2g in Hong Kong priced at USD 872 in 2015  
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Table 6. Numbers of retail outlets and ivory items on view in eastern Asia markets, 2009–2017 
Country (Territory) Date Retail outlets (no.) Ivory items (no.) Items/outlet (no.) 
Japan Nov 2009 13 dept stores 296 23 
China January 2011 119 6,719 56 
China May 2014 275 8,444 31 
Hong Kong  Jan 2015 72 30,856 429 
Macau  Jan 2015 22 327 15 
Philippines Feb 2015 24 350 15 
China Nov 2015 159 3,378 21 
Vietnam  Dec 2015 242 16,099 67 
Lao PDR Dec 2016 81 13,248 164 
Myanmar Dec 2017 51 14,846  291 
Total 9 years  1,058 94,563 89 
Source: surveys by LV (details in publications in Annexes 17,23,24,25,26,19,27) 
 
Table 7 Percentages of main ivory items displayed for sale in eastern Asia, 2009–2017 
Country 
(Territory) 
Location Item and percentage 
Japan Tokyo/Osaka (dept. store) Name seal 70%, Tea container lid 16%, Misc. 14% 
China Guangzhou Jewellery 65%, Figurine 14% 
China Beijing Pendant 31%, Figurine 17%, Charm 7% 
 Shanghai Pendant 19%, Figurine 15%, Name seal 11% 
Hong Kong Central/Kowloon Figurine 31%, Ring 25%, Pendant 14% 
Macau Macau Figurine 40%, Jewellery 40%, Name seal 5% 
Philippines Manila Santos 32%, Human figurine 16%, Animal figurine 10% 
China Shenyang Pendant 57%, Figurine 13%, Necklace 7% 
 Tianjin Pendant 40%, Figurine 16%, Necklace 12% 
 Nanjing Pendant 34%, Figurine 13%, Bracelet bead 7% 
 Changzhou Screen 28%, Polished tusk 15%, Paintbrush pot 7% 
 Hangzhou Pendant 44%, Figurine 17%, Necklace 9% 
 Suzhou Pendant 39%, Bangle 17%, Figurine 12% 
Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City Pendant 51%, Bangle 10%, Figurine 7% 
 Buon Ma Thuot  Ring 39%, Pendant, 32%, Bangle 14% 
 Tourist village nearby Pendant 52%, Ring 18%, Earrings pair 12% 
 Hanoi  Pendant 44%, Bangle 11%, Figurine 8% 
 Village south of Hanoi Pendant 39%, Bangle 23%, Ring 14% 
 Village north of Hanoi Pendant 36%, Figurine 22%, Bangle 17%  
Lao PDR Vientiane Pendant 31%, Necklace 21%, Bangle 12% 
 Dansavanh Nam Ngum Pendant 62%, Bangle 24%, Bracelet bead 5% 
 Luang Prabang Pendant 47%, Bangle 15%, Necklace 11% 
 Kings Romans Pendant 22%, Necklace 17%, Bracelet bead 14% 
Myanmar Yangon  Pendant 61%, Necklace 12%, Bracelet bead 7% 
 Mandalay Pendant 57%, Necklace 11%, Figurine 7% 
 Tachileik Pendant 65%, Name seal 10%, Earrings pair 6% 
 Mong La Pendant 59%, Necklace 11%, Chopsticks pair 8% 
Source: surveys taken by LV (details in publications in Annexes 17,23,24,25,26,19,27, and Vigne and Martin 2011a,b) 
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3.5 Trends  
3.5.1 Why rhino horn and ivory? – New wealth and expanding uses 
Ivory works of art for the rich have been part of the world’s cultural heritage for centuries 
and master carvers’ techniques, passed down generations, are still revered around the world, 
especially amongst collectors and museums. This is despite some recent Western beliefs that 
antiques encourage poaching (Levy 2018) and ought to be globally banned. Others instead 
argue that rather than destroying ivory artworks, they should be displayed in museums as 
educational ambassadors, not only as art and part of history but also for conservation (Good 
et al. 2019). Historically, and in the last 40 years, ivory continues to be carved as ornaments, 
decoration and for expensive utilitarian use. For rhino horn, historic expert carving (Box 7) is 
no more, but new uses have emerged in recent years.  
 
Box 7. Past uses of rhino horn 
Rhino horns from both Asian and later African species were carved into fine bowls and large 
libation cups for the elite in many dynasties of Imperial rulers in China. Some were used to detect 
poison that would apparently fizz in a rhino horn cup (Martin 1990; Chapman 1999). Rhino horn 
and other valued rhino products (the Sumatran species being usually most favoured) have been 
consumed as an expensive traditional medicine for hundreds of years, mainly to reduce high fevers 
(But et al. 1990; Martin 1980a; Martin 1983). In the early 1990s when China’s government factories 
were still manufacturing patent medicines containing small amounts of rhino horn for export to the 
richer overseas Chinese (for much needed hard currency), the factories had crates of left-over 
rhino horn chips from Yemen, and also sacks of Qing and Ming dynasty cups. They were unaware 
of the latter’s value and cultural significance and the precious objects were being smashed up to 
turn into medicines (Martin 1990; Martin and Vigne 1994). China banned domestic trade in rhino 
horn in 1993 following US pressure (Vigne and Martin 1994b), but the question remains—what 
happened to those antiques and all the registered rhino horn stock of 8,497 kg? (Vigne and Martin 
1994b) Is it all still sealed up in a government vault? 
Rhino products were considered to have many curative properties in TCM that then passed on into 
TVM, but not historically as an aphrodisiac (Parker and Martin 1980). This idea occurred historically 
only among a small group of Muslim Indians north of Mumbai. We believe from our research in this 
region, that Gujarati traders who sailed to Zanzibar in the 19th century were misinterpreted by early 
Europeans who thought it was used mostly in the Far East as an aphrodisiac (Vigne and Martin 
1987a; Divyabhanusinh et al. 2018).  
 
As a new richer class grew in the 21st century in Vietnam, from old uses of rhino horn for 
artworks and as a still valued and important ingredient in TVM (Dang and Nielsen 2020) so 
evolved new uses for a prosperous middle class. Many were superstitious regarding 
medicinal cures, as we were to find. In Vietnam from about 2010 the incorrect Western 
reporting of rhino horn aphrodisiac use in TCM spread and encouraged some Vietnamese to 
use it for this purpose.  It was also by then being used as a hangover cure for whisky-drinking 
businessmen at dinner gatherings (neither use recognized in TVM). Rhino horn became 
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increasingly in demand among the rich to impress fellow officials and business colleagues 
(Ammann 2011). Another new use in Vietnam was as an expensive cancer cure for desperate 
people, as we confirmed in Hanoi in a modern hospital where doctors admitted that patients 
will try to save lives with rhino horn, though it is not prescribed and is illegal (Vigne and 
Martin 2016a). Being the most expensive material, it was considered the best. My fieldwork 
focused, however, on learning about the new main consumption of the horn in Vietnam—
turning it into basic big jewellery items, mostly for rich Chinese men, and also women, with 
the cheaper leftovers usually for sale as expensive TCM and TVM.  
Similarly the North Yemeni traditional use of rhino horn for jambiyas had been for the rich 
elite. Jambiyas go back at least as far as the 8th century (Varisco 1987; Martin 1990). Very 
few people could afford rhino horn; but when many poor became rich in the 1970s they 
wanted a chance to emulate the elite and own a rhino horn jambiya. Now, while most 
Yemenis are poor again and demand has shifted to the newly rich countries, they are not 
selling their precious jambiyas unless desperate. Traditional views of people in societies with 
deeply entrenched customs die hard—especially if they are without Western modern 
education, and during or after wars. 
For ivory also, demand has been dependent on purchasing power and has been part of many 
rich cultures for thousands of years. Elephant ivory is especially versatile to carve and was 
highly valued in the Roman and other empires (Walker 2009; Somerville 2016). In Japan, 
ivory was also historically appreciated by the small elite. Then during Japan’s economic 
boom in the 1970s and 1980s its ivory industry flourished. Not only the CITES ban and 
campaigns, but also Japan’s recession caused a steady drop in consumption as we have seen 
(Vigne and Martin 2010a; 2010b). During interviews with traders in late 2018, I learned 
that, although legal domestically, consumer decline continues as most Japanese are now more 
cautious with their money.  
The famous ivory industry of India (catering mostly to the rich Western market), ended 
abruptly, after the CITES ivory ban.  A domestic ban was put in place as well, with high level 
political commitment and effective management. India, Nepal and Sri Lanka have elephants 
and a long history in carving ornate ivory items for the rich and for export (Martin 1980b; 
Martin et al. 2013b). In India, over 2,000 ivory carvers produced works of art and souvenir 
trinkets in 1989 when Esmond Martin and I carried out the last survey of India’s ivory 
industry during a six-week study of the major workshops and markets (Martin and Vigne 
1989b). When the CITES ban came into force in January 1990 India effectively stopped its 
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domestic ivory and mammoth ivory trade without flinching, deciding mammoth ivory was a 
look-alike material that would mask elephant ivory. They took the most extreme position of 
all major consuming countries (Vigne 1991). Thus despite having a long ivory carving 
tradition producing valuable items, and with much human/elephant conflict (Conrad 2012; 
Shaffer et al. 2019), the ivory industry in this region ended. This was largely due to good 
political leadership setting an example to officials and law-abiding citizens, which is lacking 
in those corrupt countries with officials themselves involved in illegal trade. 
China’s ivory carvings, some of the best in the world, had patronage for centuries from the 
Imperial City (Martin and Stiles 2003). Following China’s recent economic boom (30 years 
after Japan’s economic boom) suddenly rich government officials supported a revival of the 
nation’s cultural heritage: their carved ivory. Chinese businessmen purchased abroad and 
brought back home expensive Chinese-carved ivory and rhino horn antique artworks, and 
auctions for these in China were permitted (Gao and Clark 2014; Gao et al. 2016; Chou 
2018). Antique centres and antique markets blossomed in China, with mainland Chinese 
being keen collectors for investment (Martin and Vigne 2011b; Vigne and Martin 2014b; 
Vigne and Martin 2017b).  
For President Xi Jinping of China to stop the domestic trade in ivory when at last many could 
afford to enjoy their rich cultural traditions, was a significant sacrifice (following political 
pressure from the USA). Master ivory carvers have always been much respected in China for 
their skill. Yet during my interviews with certain master carvers in China (Vigne and Martin 
2017b) they were resigned to the ban and could not adapt to inferior mammoth ivory which 
often crumbled, especially for their most intricate works such as shallow calligraphy carving. 
They preferred now to carry out this painstaking work on bamboo. Many other ivory carvers 
did shift to mammoth ivory as a substitute, and I saw in Guangzhou in late 2018 thousands of 
newly carved items for Chinese (mainly small items) and Western customers (who favour 
expensive whole tusks). It is uncertain whether mammoth ivory, imported in tonnes from 
Siberia every year, will help or hinder the survival of elephants. There is a need to research 
this trade between Russia and China and to inspect regularly, perhaps with trained detection 
dogs, to deter and check that mammoth ivory trinkets for sale are not mixed with small look-
alike elephant ivory objects.  
Ironically illegal dealers usually mechanically process rather than hand carve their ivory and 
rhino horn, selling these expensive materials merely by weight without the added value of 
craftsmanship (Figs. 7 and 8). Mass production has been meeting demand for a new, bigger 
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clientele, with poor quality items sold to undiscerning mass consumers. As we now know 
from our research, beads, bangles and pendants are increasingly made by machines for some 
of the new undiscriminating middle class buying online (Ammann 2013; Vigne and Martin 
2018b; WJC 2020a).  
It was this sudden ‘cash in the hand’ that enabled many previously poor people to buy for the 
first time items made of rare ‘luxury’ wildlife products (Martin and Vigne 2011b; Vigne 
and Martin 2011a; Vigne and Martin 2014b; Vigne and Martin 2017b). There has also 
been a speculative market for raw or polished tusks with opportunistic traders stockpiling for 
the future, perhaps 1,000 tonnes. That would explain the sustained high level of elephant 
killing; and it would explain the recent surge in rhino poaching too (Stiles et al. 2015). This is 
not a new phenomenon; tusks were stockpiled in Japan and rhino horns in Taiwan in the 
1980s and early 1990s (Vigne and Martin 1989; Vigne and Martin 1994c; ACET 2019).  
Inflated prices in publications have long promoted demand for raw ivory and rhino horn, for 
instance writers mixing wholesale prices with retail (Stiles et al. 2011; Vigne and Martin 
2016b). For rhino horn, the 2012/2013 wholesale peak figure of USD 65,000/kg (Vigne and 
Martin 2018b) was often misquoted as a later price, although it dropped appreciably (Vigne 
and Martin 2018b; WJC 2018), as for wholesale raw ivory in Vietnam (WJC 2020c). 
Accuracy is also needed with dates, position on the supply chain, size, and quality etc. (tips 
being the most expensive) to avoid these incorrectly exaggerated prices that ‘sell’.  
3.5.2 How has demand spread? – The recent Chinese diaspora  
My work showed a precipitate growth in Chinese demand for ivory items in Africa as 
Chinese traders and construction workers poured into African countries in the 2000s. They 
bought souvenirs and gifts of worked ivory ‘from Africa’. These were much cheaper than in 
China and on sale in unregulated markets in open view. Chinese visitors, mainly workers and 
traders, increased in Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan (Box 1). I saw some buying 
handfuls of ivory items in Angola at a tenth of the price in China, to smuggle home to sell, 
fuelling the illegal trade. In central Africa semi-worked ivory has been available for illegal 
export (Nkoke et al. 2017) and in South Africa certain Chinese are making semi-worked 
rhino horn to smuggle more easily out of Africa into China (Moneron et al. 2017). The 
percentage growth rate of Chinese in Africa will likely continue to be high (Poston and Wong 
2016). 
With the proliferating Chinese diaspora, trade connections aided by bribery and corruption 
have encouraged criminal networks, with known ‘kingpins’ smuggling ivory, rhino horn and 
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other endangered wildlife products from Africa to eastern Asia. Some of these well-known 
traders are from China (EIA 2017), Vietnam (EIA 2018), Thailand (Rademeyer 2012), and 
Lao PDR (EIA 2015). Even back in March 2013 to coincide with CITES CoP16 in Bangkok, 
the counter-trafficking organization based in Thailand, Freeland, publicized Vixay 
Keosavang in Lao PDR (Fuller 2013; ACET 2019). This ‘trader’ used the cover of a wildlife 
farm and, still well protected, he and his colleagues are free to carry on flourishing 
businesses. Corruption aids long-distance trafficking, and some ‘kingpins’ still continue 
unhindered. Bribery keeps them free or often reduces their sentences. The large profits of 
illegal trade still outweigh the costs and risks (Vigne and Martin 2018b). 
Shipping routes have become more complex for bulk items such as raw ivory and pangolin 
scales, while for smaller items of worked ivory and rhino horn, international airports remain 
major hubs, with numerous regular flights back and forth between China and countries in 
Africa (Utermohlen 2020). Raw tusks and rhino horn reaching Indochina can be quickly 
processed often by machines for speedy turnover for Chinese shoppers nowadays in this 
region (Figs. 9 and10). In January 2020 I saw many Chinese crossing the Mekong River from 
Thailand to Lao PDR into the Lao Special Economic Zone in the northwest of the country. I 
revisited the infamous Lao Kings Romans casino there (the majority shareholder being 
Chinese), in a follow up to my survey of 2016 when I had found over 1,000 ivory pieces and 
77 rhino horn items (Vigne and Martin 2017a). Only one shop still had some ivory items (8 
small objects) for sale and I saw no rhino horn items on view, due to effective crackdowns 
against displayed items. It is, of course, unclear what goes on behind the scenes. Further 
north, in the border town of Mong La on the Myanmar side of the China border there were 
still many luxury illegal African ivory and rhino horn items openly for sale in January 2020 
(Vigne and Nijman in prep). This is a Chinese enclave in an autonomous region of Myanmar 
and has no effective inspection of shops, yet. On the other hand, in Vietnam ivory and rhino 
horn items that I surveyed in 2015 have, after police raids, been removed from view (Stoner 
et al. 2017). But secret production and sale in Indochina continues, as seen most recently in 
Cambodia (WJC 2020a). Chinese tourists in Vietnam in 2019 in fast-spreading Chinese 
resorts can buy worked ivory as souvenirs and gifts (Sarah Ferguson, TRAFFIC Vietnam, 
pers. comm., October 2019). With Chinese investments around the world still expanding, 
demand is not going away, and this needs further investigation to combat it, even if COVID-
19 has slowed down travel and trade for now (WJC 2020c). There appears to be in Central 
and South America, also, a link between increased Chinese investment and jaguar seizures in 
international trade coming from poor and corrupt countries with new economic partnerships 
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with China, rather than from the old established Chinese communities of the region (Morcatty 
et al. 2020).  
3.5.3 What are the changes in marketing and trade? – The digital world 
Illegal trade has been blatantly strengthened by the internet and the mobile phone. There has 
been a growth in online shopping apps making mass marketing and purchasing products 
easier than ever before. This has been the biggest development since our initial fieldwork in 
the 1980s and 1990s. As restrictions on rhino horn and ivory trade have increased, more 
items are sold from mobile phones and on social media. Traders have shown me their 
products for sale on smartphones in Indochina and China, for example (Vigne and Martin 
2016a; 2017a; 2017b). Black market sales ‘under the counter’ have been increasing. Social 
media especially WeChat that started in China in 2011, makes closed chat groups and sales of 
ivory and rhino horn simple. Sellers on different sites can switch accounts to cover their 
tracks and stay anonymous (Guan and Xu 2015; Xiao and Wang 2015). The ‘physical’ shops 
in China are often empty as more people shop online with home deliveries arranged. 
Facebook and Instagram in Southeast Asia enable easy sales of wildlife items (Krishnasamy 
and Stoner 2016; Krishnasamy and Zavagli 2020; Indraswari et al. 2020). Whole tusks and 
rhino horns can be quickly bought and sold on the internet by rich Chinese investing their 
money, especially with the turbulence and uncertainty in the stock market as occurred in 
2009 (Vigne and Martin 2018b)  because both  substances are durable and long lasting. 
Although only a fraction of China’s population desire these objects, in a country of over 1.4 
billion people (Vietnam’s population in 2020 is over 97 million people) there is still a 
sizeable number of willing buyers. 
During 2020, for instance, with the outbreak of COVID-19, the internet enabled new 
marketing for TCM with rhino horn Angong Niu Huang Wan pills (EIA 2020a). These are 
also called ‘Bezoar Chest Functioning pills’ that in the late 1980s Esmond Martin found were 
still being made with rhino horn as an ingredient for exported medicines (Martin 1989b) – 
which later was stopped by the China government.  
Large-scale cybercrime has become a major concern, as discussed at CITES CoP18 (CITES 
2019d). The internet encourages organized wildlife crime in many species. The digital world 
facilitates fast and easy transactions (Bird et al. 2020) with the tropics’ high biodiversity 
worst affected. Chinese traders online sell rare and valuable products to maximize their 
profits, with critically endangered animals, being the scarcest, making the most profit (Mason 
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et al. 2012; 't Sas-Rolfes et al. 2014). And the internet easily allows money laundering, 
notably through ivory and rhino horn sales (UNODC 2020). 
3.5.4 Which direction is demand going? – A greater threat to many species  
Demand for wildlife resources from a growing and richer globalized human population is a 
devastating threat to our increasingly fragile biodiversity. Nearly 6,000 different species of 
fauna and flora were seized from 1999 to 2018 (UNODC 2020). I saw in early 2013 in 
northern Lao PDR, as well as incipient, steady deforestation, an array of hunted, trapped, 
dead and alive wild animals for sale on the road-sides, including piled cages for pangolins 
(Manis spp.).Vietnamese and Chinese ordered pangolins to take away in their car boots back 
home across the border (Vigne 2013b; Heinrich et al. 2017). Three years later I saw the same 
indigenous forest replaced on the hillsides by rubber plantations to meet Chinese demand. 
The local people regretted that they had been persuaded to cut down their indigenous forests 
for Chinese desire for rubber, because the price of rubber had fallen and their natural habitat 
ruined. Hardwood trees are being rapidly cut down in the tropics and wildlife plundered. I 
saw helmeted hornbill on display (Table 1) selling for over USD 2,000 for a casque in an 
expensive hotel gift shop (Fig. 3) in Lao PDR in 2016 (Vigne and Martin 2017a). In January 
2020 helmeted hornbill jewellery items were selling in Mong La (Vigne and Nijman in prep). 
This critically endangered Southeast Asian bird is greatly threatened (Krishnasamy et al. 
2016a). Also in Mong La in January 2020 were boxes-full of pangolin scales destined for the 
Chinese market as “China has run out of its own pangolins”, vendors explained (Vigne and 
Nijman in prep). Small border towns allow easy trans-boundary crossings for many wildlife 
species. Boten town in the biodiversity-rich forests of north Lao PDR is beside the southern 
China border, a designated special economic zone enabling Chinese traders to buy wildlife 
and products (Krishnasamy et al. 2018; Vigne and Martin 2018b).  
The mounting demand for pangolin scales from Asia and more recently Africa prompted 
CITES Parties to vote all eight species onto Appendix I in 2016 (that came into force in 
2017) (UNODC 2020). A prior CITES zero quota on all four Asian species had not worked 
(Challender et al. 2019). And Appendix I prohibition appears not to have worked yet either. 
Tonnes are smuggled in ever bigger shipments from Africa (WJC 2020b).  
The need to monitor and find workable strategies to save ever more species is desperately 
urgent. Overall, however, for rhinos and elephants in 2019/2020, it appears that poaching has 
been reduced in most range states (Emslie et al. 2019; Thouless pers. comm., Save the 
Elephants (STE), September 2020). Greater law enforcement in China (EIA 2017) appears to 
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have assisted in rhino horn and ivory prices falling (WJC 2018; WJC 2020c), allowing 
cautious optimism, but post COVID-19 is yet to come (WJC 2020c). Meanwhile, tremendous 
numbers of wildlife, especially in tropical countries, are being poached or taken brutally for 
illicit trade – with their suffering largely ignored (Baker et al. 2013), in Africa and also in 
Southeast Asia and South America (TRAFFIC 2008; Charity and Ferreira 2020). 
The illegal and unsustainable wildlife trade is a colossal threat to the health of the planet and 
needs urgently to be defeated.  Substantial international funding is needed. (Dobson et al. 
2020). Policy makers and stakeholders require updated empirical trade data on ivory, rhino 
horn, and other species, in order to take action against over-exploitation. Wildlife habitats 
when fragmented decimate species’ numbers (Chase et al. 2020). With future uncertainties 
about COVID-19, researchers are aware of the need to find greater financial incentives to 
guard wildlife.  (Lindsey et al. 2020; Roe et al. 2020). Humanity must seek new and effective 
methods to save the world’s biodiversity (Challender et al. 2020), not only for elephants and 
rhinos as so-called keystone / flagship / umbrella species, but for species not sheltered under 
that umbrella.  
We have learned that rhino horn and ivory bans in range and consumer states lacking local 
community support and also effective law enforcement do not work.  CITES was never 
designed as a law enforcement body.  A coordinated programme to galvanise Customs and 
Police with  international teamwork is needed to tackle wildlife crime. Important strategies 
are intelligence gathering, internet research, and preventing trafficking through ports/airports. 
COVID-19 has brought the lethal dangers of wildlife trafficking to the forefront of 
government challenges at vast expense. There has been media coverage about increased 
wildlife market restrictions in China (Gorman 2020), China’s controls of  industries 
(TRAFFIC 2020), and wildlife trade government investigations in Vietnam (Tatarski 2020). 
Countries need shared aims and objectives for workable solutions, as for climate change.  
Stockpiles of ivory and rhino horn must also be dealt with and managed properly and 
transparently to prevent theft, particularly as quantities accumulate in African range states 
(Martin et al. 1993; Mason et al. 2012; 't Sas-Rolfes et al. 2014). Despite much funding 
through Western NGOs for ‘demand reduction’ campaigns in China and Vietnam, demand 
continues. More research has now been conducted to look into this issue (Hanley et al. 2017; 
Burgess et al. 2018; Thomas-Walters et al. 2020). People do not always respond well to 
outsiders’ views (Dang et al. 2020), or those of non-experts as we witnessed in Yemen. Local 
knowledge and scientific collaboration, with government support, is needed to find/promote 
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acceptable alternatives/substitutes, as appropriate. In the past domestic water buffalo horn 
and Saiga antelope horn were used in TCM for rhino horn (Martin and Vigne 1987). But  
great care is  needed with species substitution. Disease destroyed many of the immense 
numbers of Saiga antelope in the Central Asian steppe, requiring them to go onto Appendix II 
in 2008 (Table 1). Future substitutes with biotechnology improvements are still being 
considered (Chen 2017; Mi et al. 2019), and perhaps a suitable substitute will be found for 
Yemeni jambiyas too.  
Forensics and molecular research are fast developing areas that can reinforce law 
enforcement. Rhino horn DNA testing that started in South Africa (Harper et al. 2018) is 
expanding, and a DNA ivory testing lab in Cambodia was more recently initiated (FFI 2017). 
Hong Kong researchers can now molecularly test captive birds to see if they are wild-caught 
(illegal) or bred in captivity (Toropov 2020a), and we need ways easily to distinguish ivories, 
rhino horn and other materials with fast and cheap methods. 
Corruption is a major obstacle undermining governance, but can be overcome. For example, 
thanks to China’s anti-corruption campaign under President Xi Jinping (announced in late 
2012) ‘gift-giving’ of carved ivory pieces as favours/bribes to officials fell significantly. This 
reduced sales of expensive ivory carvings and helped raw ivory prices come down (Vigne 
and Martin 2014b; Vigne and Martin 2017b). Corruption occurs all along the supply 
chain; demonstrable accountability with new technological tools is essential (Vigne and 
Martin 2018b; Smith et al. 2015). 
Legislation and penalties for illegal ivory and rhino horn trade have increased on paper in 
various countries but often fail to be implemented.  Prompt prosecutions and appropriate 
sentencing are imperative (Shamini Jayanathan, criminal barrister on illegal wildlife 
trafficking, September 2020). In Hong Kong a new strategy of ‘giving wildlife a voice’ could 
save time in court by providing briefing documents for magistrates to learn the severity of 
wildlife crimes and help them give proportionate sentences (Toropov 2020b). 
Incentives/rewards according to enforcement success would help identify ‘kingpins’ (ACET 
2019). Criminal networks must be dismantled (Haas and Ferreira 2016) with top/’kingpin’ 
traders appropriately convicted and their assets seized for restitution funds. Jailing low level 
poachers who are ‘dispensable’ is comparatively useless. (Vigne and Martin 2018b; ACET 
2019). Wildlife trafficking is slowly joining the ranks of other international serious crimes 
such as drugs, money laundering and sexual slavery (Smith et al. 2015; Wingard and Pascual 
2018; Grobler 2019; FATF 2020; EIA 2020b; UNODC 2020). 
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3.6 Concluding remarks 
After my initial research collating substantive data on plummeting rhino numbers in Africa in 
the early 1980s, I focused on research in the biggest consumer country of African rhino horn 
at the time: North Yemen. I worked with Yemenis and the government, including finalizing 
Yemen’s joining of CITES, with my long-term colleague Esmond Martin. Since the 1980s 
we also worked on combating rhino poaching on the Indian subcontinent, again spreading 
awareness of the problems being faced. I carried out numerous ivory and rhino horn market 
surveys in sometimes dangerous and difficult conditions, in the struggle against illegal sales 
in relation to shifting demands, contributing to weaken this threatening trade.  I helped bring 
much needed worldwide attention to the trafficking of rhino horn and ivory, encouraging 
more researchers and nations to help combat it.     
China’s economic boom in the 2000s triggered a revival in illegal ivory and rhino horn uses 
after a decade of reduced poaching and trade.  Indochina also has witnessed an expansion in 
illegal ivory and rhino horn trafficking, mainly to supply Chinese demand.  My survey work 
again has helped to restrict this trade, providing evidence about physical markets of major 
concern, needing firmer law enforcement. 
The internet now enables swift illegal sales transactions. But advances in technology are 
helping to impede these. There is greater global focus on the importance of adequate funding, 
collaborative digital intelligence, and investigative skills to dismantle today’s international 
smuggling cartels. Improved monitoring and law enforcement with committed Police, 
Customs, the judiciary and civil society engagement are key. It is vital to blunt the plundering 
of wild fauna and flora, notably high value species, and subdue unsustainable consumer 
demand. There must be good leadership, and greater involvement from local communities 
living close to rhinos, elephants and all wildlife, as well as from consuming nations, to 
protect biodiversity from international criminal networks who are the profiteers of illegal 
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Fig. 8. Rhino horn and ivory items for sale in northern Vietnam, 2015 
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Telephone: 254-20-2512439, Mobile 254-724-441677 
P.O. Box 15289 - 00509, Nairobi, Kenya 







                                                     13 May 2019 
 
To: PhD Committee members 
 
Lucy Vigne plans to submit a paper we published jointly in Oryx in 1985 (see below) 
as a contribution towards her PhD by Published Work.  
Lucy worked as the executive officer for the IUCN African Elephant and Rhino 
Specialist Group from 1983 to 1985 when I was Chair. She collected and compiled 
data over many weeks from researchers across Africa on the numbers and 
distribution of rhinos. Based on her research we jointly publishing the findings in the 
journal Oryx. The paper was the first continental assessment of the status of the 
black rhino and the conservation strategy adopted by the IUCN African Elephant and 
Rhino Specialists Group. The paper suggested the steps taken were halting the 
decline and marking a turnaround for the species. Subsequent surveys have shown 
the species to be recovering steadily despite a continue illegal trade in rhino horn 
which Lucy and Esmond Bradley Martin have done so much to research and 
publicize over the last two decades. I affirm that Lucy was an equal partner in all 
respect in the research into the status of the rhino the publication of the paper: 
Western D, Vigne L. 1985. The deteriorating status of African rhinos. Oryx XIX:215–
220. (Conception: DW; data collection: LV; analysis: DW, LV; writing: DW, LV).  
Lucy continued her career investigating the trafficking of rhino horn and ivory and 
surveying retail markets in Africa and Asia with her long-term colleague Esmond 
Martin. Her research work has been published widely over many years and has 








Chairman of the board 
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To the PhD Committee 
Subject: Lucy Vigne and contributions to our co-authored paper. 
 
21 May 2019 
 
Dear Members of the PhD Committee 
 Lucy Vigne intends to present a TRAFFIC Report we produced together in her PhD by 
Published Works after a visit in the 1990s to Yemen (Esmond, Lucy and myself) to study 
rhino horn dagger handles. 
 Martin E, Vigne L, Allan, C. 1997. On a Knife's Edge: The rhinoceros horn trade in Yemen. 
TRAFFIC International, Cambridge, UK. Conception: CA, EM, LV; field data collection: 
LV, CA, EM; analysis: EM, LV, CA; writing: EM, LV, CA. 
 I confirm that the contributions described above were made by Lucy who carried out most of 
the data collection in the souk without Esmond, who was too recognizable to enter for the 
initial counts. This explains why she appears first in the field data collection category as 
above. I have known Lucy and Esmond’s work investigating wildlife trafficking for many 
years that often involved difficult and dangerous studies in the field. Their work has been 
very important in providing vital insights into the dynamics of illegal wildlife trade and Lucy 
played an equally significant role. 
Yours sincerely, 
Crawford Allan  
 
Senior Director, TRAFFIC 
c/o WWF, 1250 24th St. NW 
Washington DC 20037, U.S. 
Phone: +1 202 495 4517 
Email: crawford.allan@traffic.org 
Visit www.TRAFFIC.org 
Working in strategic alliance with WWF & IUCN since 1976 to provide objective, science-
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Iain Douglas-Hamilton, D.Phil, CBE 
Trustees: Professor Fritz Vollrath (Chairman), Marlene McCay, Peter Henderson, Ambrose 
Carey, Miles Geldard, UK Reg Charity No. 1118804 · HMRC Number: XT11693 
 
15th May 2019 
 
To the PhD Committee for Lucy Vigne 
Lucy Vigne – re Statement on contributions to a co-authored paper 
 
Dear members of the PhD Committee, 
 
I wish to state that Lucy Vigne wishes to include a paper in her PhD by Published Work that 
I produced with her and the late Dr Esmond Martin that was published in Pachyderm in 2007 
as below: 
 
Martin E, Okita-Ouma B, Vigne L. 2007. Increased demand for rhino horn in Yemen 
threatens Eastern Africa's rhinos. Pachyderm 43:73–86. 
 
I wish to confirm that Lucy made the following contributions: 
Conception: EM, LV; data collection: LV, BO-O, EM; analysis EM, BO-O, LV; writing EM, 
LV. 
Lucy Vigne worked extensively with the late Esmond Martin for many years studying the 
rhino horn and ivory trade and we have known each other through our work for several years. 
Having carried out fieldwork in many countries studying the ivory and rhino horn trade, due 
to her knowledge, Lucy is a member of both the IUCN African Elephant Specialist Group 
(AfESG) of which I am co-Chair, and the IUCN African Rhino Specialist Group (AfRSG) of 
which I was Vice Chair and now a member. 
Sincerely, 
 
Benson Okita-Ouma, PhD., MBS 
Director - Conservation Policy & Planning Save The Elephants: www.savetheelephants.org 
co-Chair of IUCN-SSC-African Elephant Specialist Group c/o IUCN ESARO; P.O. Box 
68200–00200, Nairobi. www.iucn.org/ssc-groups/mammals/african-elephant-specialist-group 
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P.O. Box 5159 
Diani Beach 80401, Kenya 
 
To: The PhD Committee in follow up to Lucy Vigne’s contributions to articles below coauthored 
with the late Esmond Martin 
 
Date: 11 May 2019 
 
Dear PhD Committee Members, 
 
Lucy Vigne plans to submit a number of articles as listed below, co-authored with the late  
Esmond Bradley Martin, and one on India with his wife who is unable to help since the murder of 
her husband. Knowing both Esmond and Lucy and their work together for many years, having 
also carried out important ivory trade fieldwork with Esmond in the past myself, many in 
collaboration with Lucy, I am in a knowledgeable position to vouch for Lucy’s contributions in 
her selected articles as stated below. 
  
Part 1: Contributions made: The rhino horn trade from Africa to Yemen 
Vigne L, Martin E. 1993. Yemen's rhino horn trade increases. Oryx 27(2):91–96. Conception: 
EM, LV; field data collection: LV, EM; analysis: LV, EM; writing: LV, EM.  
Vigne L, Martin E. 2006. The Garamba–Yemen link and the near extinction of the northern white 
rhino. Oryx 40(1):13–14. Conception: EM, LV; data collection: EM, LV; analysis: LV, EM; 
writing: LV, EM.  
Vigne L, Martin E. 2013. Increasing rhino awareness in Yemen and a decline in the rhino horn 
trade. Pachyderm 53:51–58. Conception: LV; data collection: LV, EM; analysis: LV, EM; 
writing LV, EM. 
Part 2: Contributions made: The rhino horn trade to eastern Asia 
Martin E, Martin C, Vigne L. 1987. Conservation Crisis – the rhinoceros in India. Oryx 
21(4):212–218. Conception: EM; data collection: EM, LV; analysis: EM, LV; writing LV, 
EM, CM.  
Martin E, Vigne L. 1987. Recent developments in the rhino horn trade. TRAFFIC Bulletin 9(2–
3):49–53. Conception: EM; data collection: EM; analysis: EM and LV; writing EM and LV. 
Vigne L, Martin E. 1991. Assam’s rhinos face new poaching threats. Oryx 25(4):215–221. 
Conception: LV and EM; data collection: LV, EM; analysis: LV, EM; writing LV, EM. 
Vigne L, Martin E. 1991. African and Asian rhino products for sale in Bangkok. Pachyderm 
14:39–41. Conception: EM and LV; data collection: LV, EM; analysis: LV, EM; writing LV, 
EM.  
Vigne L, Martin E. 2018. Illegal rhino horn trade in eastern Asia still threatens Kruger’s rhinos 
(written mainly after the death of Esmond Martin in early 2018). The Aspinall Foundation, 
UK. 120 pages. Conception: EM and LV; data collection: EM, LV in Kruger, LV (EM 
present) in Asia; analysis: LV, EM for Kruger, LV for Asia; writing LV, EM for Kruger, LV 
for Asia. 
Part 3: Contributions made: Ivory markets on the African continent 
Martin E, Vigne L. 2010. The status of the retail ivory trade in Addis Ababa in 2009. TRAFFIC 
Bulletin 22(3):141–146.Conception: EM and LV; data collection: LV, EM; analysis: EM, LV; 
writing EM, LV. 
Martin E, Vigne L. 2011. Illegal ivory sales in Egypt. TRAFFIC Bulletin 23(3):117–122. 
Conception: EM and LV; data collection: LV, EM; analysis: LV, EM; writing EM, LV. 
Martin, Vigne L. 2013. Lagos, Nigeria: one of the largest retail centres for illegal ivory surveyed 
to date. TRAFFIC Bulletin 25(1):35–40. Conception: EM, LV; data collection: LV, EM; 
analysis: EM, LV; writing EM, LV. 
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Vigne L, Martin E. 2014. Findings on the flourishing ivory trade in Angola’s capital, Luanda. 
TRAFFIC Bulletin 26(2):44–46. Conception: EM, LV; data collection: LV, EM; analysis: LV, 
EM; writing LV, EM. 
Part 4: Contributions made: The ivory trade in eastern Asia 
a) Eastern Asia  
Vigne L, Martin E. 2010. Consumer demand for ivory in Japan declines. Pachyderm 47:45–54. 
Conception: EM, LV; data collection: EM, LV; analysis: EM, LV; writing LV, EM. 
Vigne L, Martin E. 2016. Vietnam’s illegal ivory trade threatens Africa’s elephants. Save the 
Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 84 pages. Conception: EM, LV; data collection: LV (EM present); 
analysis: LV; writing mainly LV. 
Vigne L, Martin E. 2017. The ivory trade of Laos: Now the fastest growing in the world. Save the 
Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 88 pages. Conception: LV, EM; data collection: LV (EM present); 
analysis: LV; writing mainly LV. 
Vigne L, Martin E. 2018. Myanmar’s growing illegal ivory trade with China (written after the 
death of Esmond Martin). Save the Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 88 pages. Conception: EM, 
LV; data collection: LV (EM present); analysis: LV, writing mainly LV. 
b) China  
Martin E, Vigne L. 2011. The Ivory Dynasty: A report on the soaring demand for elephant and 
mammoth ivory in southern China. Elephant Family, The Aspinall Foundation and Columbus 
Zoo and Aquarium, UK. 22 pages. Conception: EM, LV; data collection: EM, LV; analysis: 
LV, EM; writing EM, LV. 
Vigne L, Martin E. 2014. China Faces a Conservation Challenge: The expanding elephant and 
mammoth ivory trade in Beijing and Shanghai. Save the Elephants and The Aspinall 
Foundation, UK. 88 pages. Conception: EM and LV; data collection: LV, EM; analysis: LV; 
writing LV. 
Martin E, Vigne L. 2015. Hong Kong’s ivory: More items for sale than in any other city in the 
world. Save the Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 66 pages. Conception: EM; data collection: EM, 
LV; analysis: EM, LV; writing: EM, LV. 
Martin E and Vigne L. 2016. Macau’s elephant and mammoth ivory trade today. Pachyderm 
57:78–85. Conception: EM; data collection: EM, LV; analysis EM, LV, writing EM, LV. 
Vigne L, Martin E. 2017. Decline in the legal ivory trade in China in anticipation of a ban. Save 
the Elephants, Nairobi, Kenya. 84 pages. Conception: EM and LV; data collection: LV (EM 
present); analysis: LV; writing mainly LV. 
 
Lucy worked on the rhino horn trade for WWF from 1985 to the early 1990s with Esmond Martin 
and collected data in the field on ivory markets as well (see publications above). I carried out 
fieldwork and co-authored five monographs with Esmond from 2000 to 2008 that Lucy worked 
on throughout their production. She and Esmond published later high-quality monographs from 
2011 to 2018 based on their fieldwork, focusing on the growing ivory markets in eastern Asia. 
These reports for Save the Elephants were of notable significance documenting the ivory trade in 
China and Hong Kong and the growing illegal ivory trade in Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. Lucy 
researched, wrote and produced most of the later monographs as the main author with Esmond 
leaving the data collection and writing to her, especially the latter ones, due to advancing age and 
declining health. Her work has contributed over many years to the significant expansion in 




Daniel Stiles, PhD 
Consultant on the illegal wildlife trade,   













Fig. 9. Jewellery made from illegal African ivory for sale in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 2016 
 
Fig. 10. Rhino horn chips for TCM in a Chinese market in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 2016 
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